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1 Anon., Des bekannten Diebes, Morders und Raubers Lip Tullians, und seiner
Complicen Leben und Ubelthaten. . . (Dresden, 1716) (discussed and translated in Richard
Evans, Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in Germany (Oxford, 1996), p.97.
2 Lionello Puppi, Torment in Art: Pain, Violence and Martyrdom (New York, 1991), pp.
1-50.
3Ralph Pugh, Imprisonment in Medieval England (Cambridge, 1968); Jean Dunbabin,
Captivity and Imprisonment in Medieval Europe (New York, 2002) are the two major works on
medieval imprisonment.  Ecclesiastical imprisonment for wayward monks or nuns functioned as
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Here the worldling now all bound in fetters lies
starts to fear his God, his tears flow from his eyes
Justice comes along, with gallows, wheel and sword:
God tells the pious man to enter Heaven’s door.1
Across medieval western Europe those who committed serious wrongs, such as homicide,
arson, treason, and rape were subject to a wide range of capital punishments that were seemingly
brutal, frequently bloody, and at times spectacular.  Grisly images of an executioner
dismembering a condemned’s limbs from his torso, smashing his chest cavity, gouging his eyes,
or piercing his body with hot pokers are the common subject of scaffold art in the high middle
ages.2  Such images attest to the critical role of pain in medieval capital punishment.  Whereas in
our day all attempts are made to render penal death painless, in the high and late middle ages the
tie between pain and death is not only tolerated but purposefully exacerbated.  
Other forms of punishment did exist.  While imprisonment rarely was awarded for
serious crime,3 in some parts of Europe a serious offender might escape the gallows by paying a
an accepted practice within the monasteries by the beginning of the eleventh-century. In the
secular realm, from the early twelfth-century in England imprisonment was used not only for
custodial and coercive purposes, but for punishment as well. Thus, for example, those who had
failed to carry through on the prosecution of an appeal might find themselves in gaol or Tower.
Glanvill, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly Called
Glanvill, trans. G.D. Hall (Oxford, 1994), p. 21. So too, in Bracton’s day, an appellant offering
trial by battle and withdrawing on the field was sent to prison, though recommended to mercy. 
Henry Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England, trans. S. Thorne (4 vols, Cambridge,
1968), vol.2, p. 401. While such confinements were coercive, often they contained a  penal
element.  For example, the length of sentence was often indefinite or in cases of definite
sentences the release was not conditioned upon the prisoner meeting an obligation such as the
payment of debt or carrying through with a prosecution. Pugh, Imprisonment, pp. 5-9. The same
can be said of the Continent.  As in England, rulers used  imprisonment as an alternative to a
blood sanction when the wrongdoer was thought to be too politically important to be punished in
the usual way.   Dunbabin, Captivity, p. 100.  Occasionally coercive imprisonment could also
carry a penal aspect.  Still, from the twelfth to the fifteenth-century secular courts punished by
imprisonment only on an ad hoc basis.
4 Trevor Dean, Crime in Medieval Europe (London, 2001),  pp. 118-144.
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hefty fine, or by abjuring the realm as a result of being exiled or of promising to make
pilgrimage.4  So too, a vast array of impediments to capital punishment were available. 
Procedural delays at trial were relatively easy to obtain.  And those who had committed serious
wrong could save life and limb by availing themselves of sanctuary, applying to the king for a
pardon, or invoking the claim of benefit of clergy.  Still, a convicted felon could find himself on
the gallows or hoisted upon the wheel where he was likely to undergo intense physical suffering. 
It is with this experience of penal pain that this paper is concerned.  The aim of this
enquiry is to trace those conditions of thought which situated the medieval blood sanction as an
appropriate response to serious wrongdoing.  Accordingly, and contrary to scholars such as
Elaine Scarry who argue for a naturalistic understanding of pain whereby its experience is
5 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York,
1985), p. 13.
6
 Frederick Pocock, “The King's Peace in the Middle Ages,” Harv. L. Rev. 13 (1900), p.
177; J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History  (3d. ed. 1990), p. 571. Patrick
Wormald has argued that this movement occurred earlier than Henry II's reforms, where most
historians place it.  He argues that in late Anglo-Saxon law there was already a move from
compensation to penalty by the King's hand.  Patrick Wormald, “Frederic William Maitland and
the Earliest English Law,” Law & Hist. Rev. 16 (1998), p. 16.
7 Michael Weisser, Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe (New Jersey, 1979),
pp. 52-67; Dean Crime, pp 125-126.
8 Dean, Crime, p. 126.
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actively destructive of language and the world,5 this article argues that the experience of pain in
punishment can only be understood as a happening in a historical world. Thus what punitive pain
signifies, its rhyme and reason, indeed its experiential shape, depends upon the cultural
sensibility of a given age. 
As legal historians note, the period from the twelfth to the fifteenth-century witnesses a
dramatic change in the way that medieval men and women viewed serious wrongdoing.6 
Whereas in the central middle ages, crimes such as homicide, arson, and theft were typically
considered to be private wrongs that entitled the victim or his kin to demand compensation or to
engage in a blood feud, beginning in the twelfth-century serious wrongdoing came to be seen as
an offense against a community and subject to the infliction of punishment.7  Over the centuries,
as this new conception of serious wrong takes hold, the punishments that attach to crime steadily
increase in severity.  Historians see this trend as the outcome of a preventative jurisprudence. 
“Cruel punishment taught a lesson . . .to the populace at large. The sight of punishment deterred
crime.”8  Yet, as other historians note, a hallmark of medieval dispute resolution – in both the
9 See e.g.  Richard Firth Green, A Crisis of Truth (Philadelphia, 1999), pp.81-83; Paul
Hyams, “Trial By ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law,” On the Laws and
Customs of England: Essays in Honor of Samuel Thorne eds. M Aronold, T. Green, & S Scully
(1981), p. 98; Michael Clanchy, “Law and Love in the Middle Ages,” Disputes and Settlements:
Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (1983); Trisha Olson, “Of Enchantment:
The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial,” Syracuse Law Review 50  (2000), pp.
138-141; T Kuehn, “Arbitration and law in Renaissance Florence,” Renaissance and
Reformation  23 (1987), pp. 289-92 
10 Thomas A Green, Verdict According to Conscience (Chicago, 1985), pp. 1-30 (on jury
nullification); Naomi Hurnard, The King’s Pardon for Homicide Before A.D.1307, (Oxford,
1969), is the only full treatment of the prerogative in English in this period.  For the Tudor
period see K.J. Kesselring, Mercy and Authority in the Tudor State, (Cambridge, 2003).  For
France see    Claude Gauvard, “De Grace Especial,” Crime, etat et Societe in France a la fin du
Moyen Age (Paris, 1991).  On sancruary see Trisha Olson, “Of the Worshipful Warrior:
Sanctuary and Punishment in the Middle Ages,” St. Thomas Law Review 16 (2004), pp 494-496.
11 Roselyn Rey, The History of Pain (London, 1995), p. 49.
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civil and criminal spheres – was a belief in the importance of concord and reconciliation.9 
Diverse practices and procedures such as the royal pardon, the privilege of sanctuary and the
high acquittal rate of the English jury  (to name but a few) all found justification in the belief that
the aim of justice, criminal or otherwise, was to restore right relations between a wrongdoer and
those he had offended individually and as a community.10 
This paper argues that while one cannot discount the language of deterrence that crops up
in assorted sources, the cultural acceptance of the blood sanction lay less with such utilitarian
concerns and more with that set of conciliatory principles that informed dispute resolution more
widely.  The ideal of concord, in turn, was shot through with spiritual meaning.  It both shaped
and shaded the medieval view of punitive pain.   As Roselyne Rey notes, within medieval
Christendom, bodily pain possessed an affirmative and positive meaning as that which was to be
endured as a divine gift, as a sacrificial offering that allowed the one suffering to share in
Christ’s passion, or as a sign of purgation that offered the hope of man’s redemption.11  This
12 In the realm of art history some work has been done on the redemptive meaning
spectators attached to the execution though the place of pain in this understanding has not been
explored. See Mitchell B Merback, The Thief, the Cross and the Wheel (Chicago, 1999), pp.
155-156; Samuel Edgerton, Picture and Punishment: Art and Criminal Prosecution During the
Florentine  Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985).  Similar work has been done by French and Italian legal
historians for a little later period. Michel Bee, “la Spectacle de l’execution dans la France
d’Ancien Regime,” Annales XXXVIII (1983), pp. 843-62; Adriano Prosperi, “Il sangue e
l’anima ricerche sulle compagnie di giustizia in Italia,” Quaderni Storici 51 (1982), pp. 959-999.
. 
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same cluster of beliefs informed medieval punishment even in its most excruciating and
sanguinary form.  In the realm of the schoolmen, in the cloister of the mystic, within the poetic
imagination, and in the space of the execution where men and women came to witness the death
of the condemned, one encounters the conviction that his torment opened rather than closed a
path to conciliation.  At its core the medieval execution was neither a celebration of expulsion
nor a passive witnessing of exemplary terror.  To be sure, these themes had their place.   But they
did not predominate.  Rather, the medieval execution was a ritual that opened the possibility for
the condemned who died well to be transfigured in the eyes of the spectators into a holy vessel
whose suffering signaled his entry into heaven and his reconciliation with his community.12  Our
task is to trace the details of this thought within medieval texts that spoke to the spiritual
significance of bodily pain.  We then look at the way those conditions of thought intersected
with the spontaneous practices and customs that attended the execution.  Such an enquiry, I
argue, opens a way to understanding the intelligibility of frequently bold and dramatic capital
punishments to the culture that practiced them.  
 Part One provides an overview of medieval punishment for serious wrongdoing as it 
existed from the twelfth to the fifteenth-century.  Notwithstanding the diversity of procedures
that existed in western Europe, certain themes will appear that cut across space and time and
6which are suggestive of common modes of thought.  
Part Two turns to the learned discourses upon pain that provided part of the cultural
context for the blood sanction’s imposition. The question hovering in this section is whether one
can discern a shared understanding of bodily pain that cuts across various genres?  Attempting to
answer this question requires looking at diverse sources and thus much time is spent upon the
discourses of theology, medicine, and law as well as upon texts written by those caught by an
affective piety.  One learns from these texts that the way in which various disciplines and
orthodoxies understood suffering was deeply bound up with how each conceived of the
relationship between the soul and body.   This relationship, in turn, affected discourses upon
pain’s import to man’s longing for God, to his experience of and participation in evil, and finally
to the justification for his punishment when he did wrong.  After tracing the way in which these
ideas conjoined  to form a framework for medieval thought about the significance of bodily
penal pain, we turn to Dante’s Divine Comedy for it is here that the nexus between suffering,
redemption, and  punishment finds its most luminous and exact rendering. 
In Part Three we turn to the popular practices that attended the infliction of corporeal
punishment.  By relying on a variety of sources that speak to infliction of  capital punishment,
we can discern patterns of thought that while not fully formed or schematized are nevertheless
unabashed in viewing the condemned’s pain as both a sign of his redemption and as a conduit for
its realization.    
  Two points should be made.  First, much time is spent in this enquiry considering the
thought of exceptional personages such as Thomas Aquinas, Julian of Norwich, Catherine of
Siena and Dante.  Some may doubt whether these men and women  may be considered to be
13 Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast, Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to
Medieval Women (London, 1987), p. 7.
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culturally representative.  Yet, while these were exceptional men and women, it is also true that
they were chosen by their contemporaries “as heroines, [heros], mirrors, and lessons – as lenses
through which God’s power and human aspiration were focussed toward each other.”13  Thus the
experience and thought of these theologians, saints, and poets tells us something about the
normative tenets concerning pain that were held by the culture that admired and lauded them. 
Second, given the ambition of this project to explore a variety of discourses, it is not possible to
mount a detailed investigation into the diffusion or reception of various texts or to trace all the
potential influences upon individual authors.  Yet, the aim here is not to establish, for example,
that Catherine of Siena read Thomas Aquinas and that therefore he must have influenced her
vision of the import of bodily pain.  Rather, the aim is to see whether by juxtaposing
dramatically different texts one can tease out a shared core set of beliefs about the meaning of
bodily pain in the context of  punishment. 
I. The Birth Of Criminal Law and the Function of Punishment
We begin with a brief overview of the salient features of the nascent criminal law as it
emerges in the late twelfth and thirteenth-century. 
A.  Public Crime and the Emergence of Punishment
From the twelfth to the fourteenth-century across western Europe the conception of
wrongdoing as a private affair between a wrongdoer and his victim steadily gives way to an idea
of serious wrong as an offense against the entire community which is subject to punishment by
the lord or king who acts on the community’s behalf.  
14 T.Green, Verdict According to Conscience, pp. 9, 30.
15 Frederic Maitland & F. Pollock, The History of English Law (2 vols, Cambridge,
1968), vol. 2,  p. 446.
16 Ibid.
17 Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, L. Manyon trans., (2 vols, Chicago, 1961), vol. 2, p. 359. 
It was not until the end of the fifteenth-century that the Capetians succeeded in bringing the last
of the fiefs under royal control.
18 Julius Goebel, Felony and Misdemeanors (1937), pp. 229, 237.
19 Patrick J. Geary, “Living With Conflict in Stateless France,” Living with the Dead in
the Middle Ages (Ithaca, 1994), pp. 149-151; Stephen D. White, “Feuding and Peacemaking in
the Touraine Around the Year 1100,” Traditio 42 (1986), pp. 195, 197.
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 This transition first occurs in England where by the time of Henry II serious offenses
such as homicide, larceny, robbery, arson, and rape had become pleas of the crown and were
punishable by death or mutilation.14 Frederic Maitland writes, “On no other part of [English] law
did the twelfth-century stamp a more permanent impress of  its heavy hand” than on that which
was to “be the criminal law of after days.”15  In moving from the beginning of the century to its
end, Maitland notes, one is keenly aware that they come to breath a  “different air.”16  In contrast,
there existed no well-developed state in twelfth-century France.  The blood feud remained
rampant, and  private courts dotted the landscape as a result of the Carolingian age’s granting of
immunities that gave lords jurisdiction over their fiefs and manors.17  Accusation during this
period continued to be a matter of private law.18  In those territories that would become France,
negotiated peace remained the norm.19  Yet, like England, and through the rule of strong kings
such as Philip II and Louis IX, the crown established its authority and concomitantly its role as a
guardian of justice.  
In contrast to England and France, The Holy Roman Empire in the thirteenth-century
20Maria Dobozy notes that the many manuscripts that exist of the Sachsenspiegel provide
“ample evidence that the book was conceived broadly enough to be valuable to a wide audience
both inside and outside the German speaking parts of the empire.”  The Saxon Mirror, trans.
Maria Dobozy (Philadelphia, 1999), p. 17.
21 Ibid. p. 21.
22 On both the dissimilarities and continuity between Father Konrad’s Rolandslied (c.
1172) and Der Stricker’s Karl der Grosse see Vickie L. Ziegler, Trial by Fire and Battle in
Medieval German Literature (New York, 2004), pp.21-51. 
23 Sara Rubin Blanshei, “Crime and Law Enforcement in Medieval Bologna,” Journal of
Social History 16 (1982), pp. 121-38; P. J. Jones, The Italian city-state: From Commune to
Signoria (Oxford, 1997), pp. 377-379; G. Ruggiero, Violence in Early Renaissance Venice (New
9
lacked effective royal courts and feuding continued to be a dominant method of dispute
resolution for serious wrong.  Still, the Saxon Mirror of c.1225 indicates that notwithstanding the
multiplicity of jurisdictions that existed within the empire, there was by the thirteenth-century a
developing sense that all judicial authority came from the Emperor.20  Through the assorted
incorporation of criminal punishments promulgated by rulers at various times and copied into
manuscripts of the Mirror, one sees “a steady shift from a wergeld system of composition to a
system of criminal law.”21  A hint of how a legal text mirrored cultural perception is given by
literary works such as Der Sticker’s Karl der Grosse (1215-30) where the legend of the death of
Charlemagne’s nephew Roland as a result of his betrayal by Genelun is cast as a confrontation
between the law of personal justice, feud, and compensation and law as an expression of Divine
will as represented by the Emperor and which, when transgressed, damages the Empire as a
whole.22  Similarly, in the Italian city states, beginning in the late thirteenth-century, one can
trace the movement away from a conception of serious wrongdoing as a personal and private
matter between the wrongdoer and his victim toward a public conception of wrong as against
“honorem et bonum statum comunis” (Siena, 1236).23
Jersey, 1980).
24 R.C. Van Caenegem, “Law and Power in Twelfth Century Flanders,” Cultures of
Power ed. Thomas N Bisson (Philadelphia, 1995), p.162.
25 The Eyre of Kent of 6 and 7 Edward II ( 1313-1314), ed. F.W. Maitland, L.W. Vernon
Harcourt and W.C. Bolland, (Seleden Soc., London, 1909), p. 134.
26 A Esmein, A History of Continental Criminal Procedure, trans. John Simpson
(London, 1914), pp. 50-51. 
27 Suzanne Lewis, The Art of Matthew Paris in the Chronica Majora (1987), p. 235;
Henry Summerson, “Attitudes to Capital Punishment in England,” Thirteenth Century VIII eds.
Michael Prestwich, Richard Britnell and Robin Frame (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 120-134.  There
were exceptions to hanging.  Britton tells us that burning was the penalty for arson, sodomy,
sorcery, and heresy.  Britton, ed. Francis.M. Nicolas (Oxford, 1885; 2 vols. reprint 1983), vol. 1,
10
The belief in the right of personal vengeance did not disappear even in those places
where a conception of wrongdoing as a public offense gained ground the most quickly.  Indeed,
frequently felonies could be considered as both a private and a public wrong.  Thus in Flanders
during the late twelfth-century execution of an offender might still be left to a volunteering
kinsman of the victim.24  Similarly in England in the early fourteenth-century, a victim of rape
might be expected to gouge out the eyes and/or severe the offender’s testicles herself.25   By the
mid-fourteenth-century, however, royal authority over the trial and punishment of crime had
asserted itself in western Europe.26 
This movement toward a public conception of crime was accompanied by an increase in
the severity of prescribed punishments.  By the fifteenth-century serious crime was punished by
death throughout western Europe.  The manner of execution varied according to the nature of the
crime and/or a  region’s customs.  By the late twelfth-century all felonies in England were
punishable by death.  The penalty usually imposed was hanging, though traitors, if they were
men, were dragged along the ground to the gallows by ropes attached to horses.27  From at least
pp. 41-42. 
28 Recueil des Chroniques par Jehan de Waurin trans. and ed. W. & E.L. C. P. Hardy
(London, vols. 5 1864-91), vol. 2, p. 41-43.
29 Westminster Chroncile, p. 323 (speaking of sentence of Elizabeth Wanton burnt for
aiding in death of her husband in 1388).
30 Summerson, “Attitudes,” p. 124.
31 Ibid.
32 In England, in 1352, Parliament distinguished “petit treason” (the killing of a superior)
from high treason for the first time by statute though the distinction had a long history in
customary law.  W. M. Ormrod (ed.), 'Edward II: Parliament of 1352, Text and Translation', in
The Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. C. Given-Wilson et al., item 4. CD-ROM. (SDE,
Leicester, 2005) {hereinafter The Parliament Rolls of England).1352, p. 239.
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the mid-thirteenth-century the body was sometimes disembowelled and then dismembered after
hanging.28  Women were burnt alive.29 Frequently the method of execution depended upon local
custom.  In Kent, the Eyre rolls record felons as having been “drowned by judgment” or buried
alive.30  In Dover convicted offenders were thrown from the cliffs.31  So too, those who
committed felonies that involved an element of treachery — such as wives who killed husbands,
parricides or  homicides who killed with stealth –  faced the torment of a more brutal death.32 
On the continent, punishments for serious wrongdoing were no less severe.  In Germany,
as was true across western Europe, those wrongs which involved treachery were designated as
treasonable offenses incurring death.  Thus for example, the slaying of someone while he was
asleep or the seduction of a married woman were spoken of as treason.  In Nuremberg women
were buried alive for simple theft.  And in the Saxon Mirror, the customary law of Saxony
provided that thieves were to be hanged if the amount lost was above three shillings.  All
murderers, traitors, murderous arsonists, and thieves who stole from a mill or church were to be
33 Saxon Mirror,  Bk II, § 14.
34 Ibid, Bk II, § 12.
35 Coutumes de Beauvaisis of Philippe de Beaumanoir, trans. F.P.K. Akehurst
(Philadelphia, 1992),  Ch 30,  § 824.
36 Ibid. § 304.
37 Ibid. § 826.
38  Blanshei, “Crime and Law Enforcement in Medieval Bologna,” pp. 122-123.
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broken on the wheel.33  Robbers and men who raped were to be beheaded while faithless
Christians who practised magic were to be burned on the pyre.34    
Similarly in the mid-thirteenth-century Philippe de Beaumanoir writes in regard to the
customs of Beauvais that “whoever is arrested for a serious crime and convicted, for example,
for murder, or treason, or homicide, or rape, should be drawn and hanged” and so too” he forfeits
all his wealth to the lord.”35  Arsonists, and thieves are to be hung, sodomites are to be burned,
and counterfeiters are to be boiled.36 Again, treason is given a broad definition to include those
acts where “you show no sign of hatred and yet you harbor a deadly hatred” that leads one to kill
or simply injure another.37 
In the Italian city-states of the early thirteenth-century, the common penalty for crimes of
violence was composition where the offender would pay a monetary fine to the victim.  If the
wrongdoer was contumacious he would be banished and he could not return until the
compensation was paid and a pax had been made between him and the victim or the victim’s
kin.38 By the first half of the thirteenth-century certain wrongs were seen to be outside these
practices of honour and reparation and thus prostitutes, adulterers, and sodomites were banished
39 Ibid.
40 Jones, The Italian City-state, pp. 376-377.
41 Ibid., p. 379.
42 Richard Fraher, “Preventing Crime in the High Middle Ages: The Medieval Lawyer’s
Search for Deterrence,” Popes, Teachers, and Canon Law in the Middle Ages  (1989), p. 229. 
43 Fraher, Preventing Crime, p. 221;Richard M. Fraher, “The Theoretical Justification for
the New Criminal Law in the High Middle Ages: Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant
Impunita,” Illinois Law Review (1984), p. 584.
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while hired assassins were beheaded.39   From the latter half of the thirteenth-century, this
personalized system of justice became “much harsher and depersonalized with a deterrent and
public or community-oriented conception of crime and punishment” taking centre stage.40  Thus
in late thirteenth century Bologna, legislation was enacted which prescribed a death sentence for
all homicide.  Everywhere there was a trend toward increased severity of penalties.  With the
revival of Roman law came a “growing array of savage and spectacular punishments, from death
by burning and quartering to starvation in a cage, with preliminary public torture.”41     
B.  The Argument From Deterrence and the Ideal of Conciliation and Mercy           
The movement toward increasingly severe punishments was justified on grounds of
deterrence.  It was a “new” discourse, revived from the Roman law and given a fresh life in the
work of the canonists and civilians of the early thirteenth-century.42  In 1203, Pope Innocent III
responded to the Bishop of Lund's inquiry about the propriety of laity using force upon rogue
clergy and prelates incarcerating wayward clerics.  The pope replied that both acts were justified,
for "[t]he wicked respond to impunity by becoming yet more wicked, and as a matter of public
utility crimes should not remain unpunished."43 In a similar fashion, Hostiensis, one of the most
eminent of the thirteenth-century decretalists, warned of a too-easy mercy that would provide a
44 Hostiensis, Lectura in quinque Gregorii Noni decretalium libros (Venice 1581)
(reprint, Turin, 1965), 5.39.35.
45 William Durantis, Speculum iudiciale (Basel, 1574) (2 vols., Aalen reprt. 1975), vol.2,
bk. 3,  preface. 
46 Quoted in Fraher, Preventing Crime, p. 231. 
47 Jones, The Italian City-state, p. 377.
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wrong incentive.  He argued that proper punishment “cultivate[d] terror and restrain[ed] others
from sinning.”44  In the preface to book three of his Speculum iudiciale William Durantis repeats
Innocent’s injunction concluding that “the life of the evil doer should not be endured.”45  And
fourteenth-century bishop and theologian Durandus of St. Pourçain captured the conventional
wisdom that justified deterrence: “It is possible that for some time men will do good only under
terror of punishment.46  
 As Richard Fraher has meticulously traced, though similar ideas existed in the early
Middle Ages, it was not until the scholastic age that deterrence emerged as the fundamental
justification for punishment of serious wrong (i.e. crimina or malefica) both in the work of
canonists and civil law jurists.  Representative is the work of Italian jurist Albertus Gandinus (d.
ca. 1310) who held that homicide and other major crimes remained punishable even after a
concord had been reached between a wrongdoer and his victim.47  The same assertion appears in
the early thirteenth-century in the work of Bracton.  He borrows directly from the Decretales of
Gregory IX in his discussion of non-prosecuted appeals of felony.  Notwithstanding an
appellor’s decision to retract his accusation, Bracton declares that the “felony  may nonetheless
exist, and if it is not convicted wicked deeds will thus remain unpunished, which ought not to
48 Bracton, vol.2, p. 402, n.3.
49 X 5.39.35.
50 Bracton, vol. 2,  p. 427.  On English judges borrowing from the canon law in the
context of rejecting private settlement of felonies see Daniel Klerman, “Settlement and the
Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century England.” Law and History Review 19
(2002), pp.47-49.
51 Mercanti scrittori: ricordi nella Fierenze tra Medioevo e Rinascimento, ed. V Branca
(Milan, 1986), pp. 23-4.
52 Dean, Crime, p. 126.
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be.”48 In other words, judges are discouraged from respecting out of court settlements, and urged
to instead inquire into the guilt or innocence of the accused.  The phrase ne crimina remaneant
impunita operates as a shorthand for jurists for the proposition put forth by Innocent III that the
failure to punish wrongdoers leads to an “audacity of impunity, through which those who were
bad become worse” included within the Decretales.49  In the context of prosecution of theft,
Bracton again insists on the importance of punishment even when the items taken are trivial for
to pardon the convicted man is to encourage his offending again.50  
      Over time, this new criminal jurisprudence seeps into the wider consciousness.  A
fourteenth- century Florentine writer of an advice book spoke to the exemplary function of
public executions writing “Go to church often, to sermons, because you will learn many good
examples . . . and likewise go to see men executed, not out of pleasure . . .but so that it can be of
example to you.”51  And the potential of the execution to strike terror in the heart of children was
not lost on French parents who whipped their children when offenders were hanged to imprint
the scene upon their memory.52  In the mid-fourteenth-century, Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s fresco
The Allegory of Good Government in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena portrays the allegory of
53 Puppi, Torment in Art, p. 14.
54 Quoted in Ziegler, Trial, pp. 71-72.
55 Ibid., p. 80.
56 Patricia McCune, The Ideology of Mercy in the Law and Literature of the Middle Ages
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Michigan, 1989); Thomas Green observes, the very
inaccessibility of the language of mercy to the modern may lead the historian to “underestimate
its pervasiveness and importance” to the middle ages.  “A Retrospective on the Criminal Jury
Trial 1200-1800,” eds. Thomas Green & J. Cockburn Twelve Good Men and True: The Criminal
Jury Trial in England 1200-1800  (Princeton, 1988), pp. 358-400, 387; Olson, “Of
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Securitas as a winged  woman draped only by a veil who flies over the town holding in her left
hand a gallows from which hangs a dead man.53  The image works as an exemplary  warning to
any who would breach the laws of the city-state.  And in literary texts such as the Karlmeint
written in the first half of the fourteenth-century, the author presents Karl as most concerned that
Roland’s traitorous murderer  suffers a punishment that will “give the world an example” and
“which people will consider in amazement for more than a thousand years!”54  The detailed
description of the array of horrific deaths that Karl contemplates in his pursuit of using Wellis’
death as a deterrent is striking when compared with Karl de Grosse, written only a century
earlier, where Karl casts Genelun’s punishment in the retributive language of debt asking the
court simply to determine “what kind of death [Genelun] owes” him.55  
Yet, the social and juridical lexicon of deterrence coexisted with others discourses that
point to a very different understanding of what medieval justice required in the face of serious
wrongdoing.  In the literature on good kingship, and in texts that open a window unto unwritten
customary laws and practices, the belief is expressed throughout our period that the focus of
dispute resolution – criminal or otherwise – is, and ought to be, upon concord and
reconciliation.56  So too, within the canonists’ writing, predominately in the beginning of our
Enchantment,”  pp. 182-183. 
57 Leges Henrici Primi, trans. L.J Dower (1972), p. 143 c36, 2, 2a..   
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid. p. 291, c.92, 92, 15.
60 The quote is from an eleventh-century poem which Hyams concludes found its model
in a bestiary text.  Paul Hyams, Rancor and Reconciliation (Ithaca, 20003), p. 129; Stephen D
White, (Feuding and Peace-Making in the Touraine around the Year 1100,” Traditio 42 (1986),
pp. 195-63.
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period, the propriety of mercy, toleration, and concord is emphasized.  
The import of conciliation in the resolve of private wrongs is apparent in the sources
from early in our period.  In the Leges Henrici Primi (c.1115), for example, acts of disobedience
toward one’s lord or superior were to be graciously resolved.  "[I]f anyone ma[de] amends to
another for his misdeed" and offered something beyond what was owed "along with an oath of
reconciliation," it was commendable of the wronged man to "give[] back the whole thing."57  He
continued, "it ought to be sufficient" that the accused had "in some measure offered himself to
his accuser."58   And in the context of a private right of the kin regarding a homicide the Leges
Henrici Primi declares:
With respect to an offender who has either confessed or is of manifest guilt, the proper
course is to hand him over to the relatives of the slain man so that he may experience the
mercy of those to whom he displayed none.59 
As Stephen White has uncovered in twelfth-century Touraine and Paul Hyams in post-conquest
England, though honor required the taking up of the vendetta when one was wronged by another,
so too the “noble lion whose anger spared the prostrate” was lauded.60  And notwithstanding the
consensus of jurists that judges must proceed with the prosecution of serious wrong even when a
61 Klerman, p. 16.  Note that the 17 percent is the lowest possible number for cases settled
in Klerman’s data base if one assumes that settlements were always recorded.  Ibid.  That all
settlements were recorded, however, seems doubtful.
62 A Florentine Diary from 1450-516 by Luca Landucci (New York, 1969), p. 77; Two
Memoirs of Renaissance Florence: the Diaries of Buonaccorso Pitti and Gregorio Dati (New
York, 1967), pp. 52-53.
63 B. Lenman and G. Parker, “The state, the community and criminal law in early modern
Europe,”Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe Since 1500, ed.
V.A.C. Gatrell, B. Lenman and G. Parker (London, 1980), p. 23; Edward Powell, Kingship, Law
and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Oxford, 1989), pp. 82, 91.
64 A. Zorzi, “The judicial system in Florence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,”
Crime Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, eds.  T. Dean, K.J.P. Lowe, (Cambridge, 1994),
p. 55-56. 
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private concord had been made between the malefactor and the victim, settlement continues to be
favoured by victims.  In looking at eyre records from 1194 to 1294 in England, for example,
Daniel Klerman estimates that between roughly 40 to 67 percent of cases brought by appeal were
settled.61  In fifteenth-century Florence, in the diaries of Buonaccorso Pitta and Luca Landucci
the import of “pardon” either as an imperative of Christian charity or as a demand of honor once
an adversary has responded to the required display of rage with contrition is taken as a matter of
course.62
The discourse and practice of conciliation, mercy, and tolerance also formed
countermelodies to the vocabulary of deterrence and terror that surrounded discussion of
wrongdoing as an offense against the public authority.  Indeed, there remains in the late middle
ages a blurring of the lines between private and public wrong and concomitantly running parallel
to emergent penal policy on the continent and in England was a form of dispute resolution that
focussed on accommodation between the parties and on charity.63  Late fifteenth-century
Florence is but one example as disclosed by the records of the Otto di guardia.64 
65Gervase Rosser, “Sanctuary and Social Negotiation in Medieval England.” The Cloister
and the World: Essays in Medieval History in Honour of Barbara Harvey, eds. J. Blair & B.
Golding (1996), p. 63; Trisha Olson, “Of the Worshipful Warrior: Sanctuary and Punishment in
the Middle Ages,” St. Thomas Law Review 16 (2004) pp. 473-549.
66 Green, Verdict According to Conscience, p. 22; J. G. Bellamy, Crime and Public Order
in England (London,1973), p. 124; J.G. Bellamy, The Criminal Trial in Later Medieval England
(Toronto, 1998), pp.97-98. 
67 Green’s work on the disjunction between fourteenth-century juries and the common
law on the question of the level of blame that should attach to what we today call manslaughter
is path-breaking. Green, Verdict According to Conscience, pp. 1-34.
68 Quoted in G.R. Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England (Oxford, 1966), p.
340.
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  Moreover, an accused could avail himself of a variety of procedural impediments to his
trial.  Both the claim of benefit to clergy or a flight to sanctuary legally ensured that, even if
guilty, he would not suffer a blood sanction.65  So too, in England the rate of jury acquittal
remained enormously high throughout the period, particularly in cases involving homicide.66 
The deliberations of the medieval English jury are veiled in mystery.  Still, and notwithstanding
that some of the acquittals may have resulted from lack of sufficient evidence, or from the jury’s
determination that the law or punishment in question was out of step with the norms of the
community,67  bits and pieces of evidence exist that strongly suggest the English jury often
acquitted out of simple mercy.  Indeed, it is upon this ground that a few complained about the
English jury trial.  Thomas Brinton, Bishop of Rochester in the late fourteenth-century
complained in a sermon:
If a voluntary murderer or most notorious thief who according to every law ought to pay
the just penalty of his wickedness, is captured in order that justice may be done upon his
person, as though in compassion, they strive to keep him from danger, some saying “He
is young: if a youth has gone wrong, the old man will be able to amend.”68   
69 Statutes of the Realm 1275-1713, Record Commission  (12 vols., London, 1810-28),
vol. 1, p. 26.
70 Most recently Michael McNair has emphasized the juror’s role as a witness. Michael
Macnair, “Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury,” Law and  History Review 17 (1999), p.
583..
71 Green, A Crisis of Truth, p. 20 (speaking to Richard Rolle's use of trouth to render the
Latin fidelity).  Elsewhere, Green explores the way in which “trouthe” encompassed the idea of
loyalty and the highest moral goodness).  Ibid, p. 17-23.
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The Crown voiced similar dissatisfaction a century earlier in the statute of Westminister (1275)
complaining that juries wrongfully acquitted the guilty when the accused was a local man.69  
Why the stranger was treated differently than a local defendant is a matter of speculation. 
One possible reason is offered here.  Each juror swore an oath to speak the truth (verum dicere -
verdict). Now, the juror also held the role of a  quasi-witnesses as well as an arbitrator of right.70 
Hence, he would commit perjury, a grievous sin, which put his soul at grave risk if he were to
bring in a false verdict.  Yet it is not clear at all that a “true” verdict referred to a factually
accurate judgment.  The Middle English “trouth” denotes ethical verity rather than empirical
reality.71  It is reasonable to surmise that the disparity in conviction between the stranger and the
neighbour frequently reflected the jury’s judgment about the accused’s character, a judgment
that the jury could not make in the case of the stranger.  The jury asked “is the accused law-
worthy?  A good son?  
Accordingly, the accused’s willingness to make up for his offense mattered to the jury. 
At times acquittal could be part of an outside agreement formed at a “loveday” where a
wrongdoer and victim made amends.  In Fifteenth-century England, it was not atypical for men
to be acquitted of homicide when it was shown that they had offered and made satisfaction to a
72 Edward Powell, “Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth Century England,”
Law and History Review 2 (1984), pp.27-28. 
73 Bernard W. McLane, :Juror Attitudes towards Local Disorder: The Evidence of the
1328 Lincolnshire Trailbaston Proceeding,” Twelve Good Men and True, pp. 59, 61 & n. 80.
74 Anthony Musson, “Twelve Good Men and True? The Character of the Early
Fourteenth-Century Juries,” Law and History Review 15 (1997), p. 138.
75 Green, Verdict, p. 64.
76 Bellamy, Criminal Trial, p. 97.
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victim’s kin.72  Also, it mattered to the jury whether it could count on the accused to behave
himself in the future.  In his research on the 1328 Lincolnshire Trailbaston proceedings,  Bernard
McLane found that at times acquittal in homicide cases seem to turn upon whether an accused
could find pledges to ensure his future good conduct.73  Anthony Musson has found cases in the
Fourteenth-century where the jurors themselves would act as a pledge for an acquitted
defendant.74  As Thomas Green argues, the medieval jury’s high acquittal rate reflected “deeply
engrained notions of how social harmony was to be maintained through composition with, rather
than ultimate rejection of, the offender.”75  The complaints that exist about the juries’ high
acquittal rate indicate that their inclination to be merciful was common knowledge.  Yet,
strikingly, complaints about the acquittal rate were infrequent.  Between the fourteenth and
sixteenth-century in England, not a single jurist nor chronicle writer complained that the jury
conviction rate was too low.76
There exists in this period too a deeply rooted cultural expectation that the good king will
be merciful.  In sermon literature, legal text, and the mirrors for kings the crucial role of mercy
to the good king is a constant refrain. The twelfth-century theologian, preacher, and poet Alan of
Lille refers to cruelty in his Art of Preaching as excessive justice that is the opposite of mercy. 
77 Alan of Lille, The Art of Preaching, trans. Gillian R. Evans (Kalamazoo, 1981), pp. 80,
83.
78 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
79 Leges Henric Primi. p. 115, c. II, 16a.
80 “Saint Louis' Advice to His Son,” Medieval Civilization, trans. and eds. Dana Munro
and George Clarke Sellery (New York, 1910), pp. 366 -75. 
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Clementia, he writes, characterizes the king and crudelitas the tyrant.77  Putting forth King David
as the example that men should set before their eyes he writes “Read of the clemency in David
who wore himself out bemoaning the madness of his scheming son . . .Clemency is the
adornment of princes and the steadiest light.  This alone distinguishes between the cruel and
pious, between king and tyrant.”78    Tacitly repeating the same theme, the author of the  Leges
Henrici, explains that the reason “pleas concerning more serious charges and meriting greater
punishment” are assigned to the “justice and mercy” of the king alone is that “more abundant
pardon may be had for those seeking it.”79  While the passage adds that more abundant
retribution also may be had for those transgressing, what is striking is the declared intention to
give pardon to those seeking it for what are labeled as more serious wrongs.  So too, in literary
sources across the period,  mercy is presented as a cardinal virtue of good kingship.  Louis IX of
France advises his eldest son (the later Philip III) that though it might at times be “needful” that
he make war against a faithless vassal:
Be careful not to start the war before you have good counsel that the cause is most
reasonable, and before you have summoned the offender to make amends, and have
waited as long as you should. And if he ask mercy, you ought to pardon him, and accept
his amende, so that God may be pleased with you.80 
In the mid-fifteenth century English translation of Three Considerations, it is said that without
81 “The III Consideracions Right Necesserye to the Good Governaunce of A Prince,”
Four English Political Tracts of the Later Middle Ages, ed. Jean-Philippe Genet (London, 1977),
pp.200, 199-200 
82 Hoccleve’s Regement of Princes ed. Frederick Furnivall (E.e.t.s. London, 1996), ll.
3319-3346.
83 Cal. Close Rolls 1409-1413, p. 375; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1446-1452, p. 68; ibid., p. 461;
ibid. 1334-1338, p.159. See also, Claude Gauvard, “De Grace Especial,” pp. 914-927.
84 The Westminster Chronicle, trans. LC Hector and Barbara Harvey (Oxford, 1982), p.
96-97.  Richard II frequently employed his prerogative even in circumstances where Parliament
had excepted a man from pardon as in the case of John Awedyn of Essex who had participated in
the rebellion of 1381.  Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1381-1385, p. 239. 
85 S.H. Cuttler, The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France
(Cambridge, 1981), p. 135-137.  On the pardon generally in medieval France see Yves-Bernard
Brissaud, Le Droit de grace à la fin du moyen âge (Poitiers, Thesis of law, 1971).
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mercy, justice could be considered “felonye.”81  Similarly, in Hoccleve’s Regement of Princes
written in 1411 to Henry, Prince of Wales, the virtue of forgiveness is urged.82  
The language of mercy signified more than rhetorical flourish.  Across western Europe
and throughout the period royal pardons were easily obtainable.  The reason commonly given for
the grant of a pardon was the king’s piety and his “reverence for the one of whom he had firm
hope of grace and mercy.”83  Frequently, a pardon would follow after a wrongdoer contritely
confessed his deed.  A representative example is Richard II’s pardon of John Northampton in
1384 who, though accused of plotting sedition, received the King’s grace after fully confessing
and pleading for mercy.84  Similarly in France, convicted traitors, if they were contrite and
formally returned to the king’s obedience, could obtain pardon.85  The penitential analogue in
kingly acts of grace is unmistakable.  Legal historians tend to be critical of the pardon
prerogative  considering it to be antithetical to a civilized system of justice whereby inexcusable
86 Naomi Hurnard, The King’s Pardon, p. 25.  See also H. Lacey, “‘Mercy and Truth
Preserve the king’: Richard II’s use of the Royal Pardon’’, (International Medieval Congress,
Leeds, 2004), unpublished paper; R.L. Storey, The End of the House of Lancaster (London,
1966) pp. 210-216. 
87 Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, p. 195; J Jusserand, English Wayfaring Life in the
Middle Ages, trans. L. T. Smith ((1891 reprt. 1961) p.166. 
88 10 Edw. 3, c.2; Westminster Chronicle, p. 417 (complaint of parliament in 1390).  In
the fourteenth-century, the English Parliament also complained in 1310 and 1347.   
89 H. Lacey, ‘‘The King’’s Mercy: Perceptions of Pardoning in the Late Medieval Legal
System’’, (Political Culture Research Group, York, 2003), unpublished paper.
90 Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, of 1377, pp. 361-316.
91 W.M. Ormrod, “Edward III,” History Today 52 (2002), pp. 20-26.
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wrongdoing should be properly punished in the name of deterrence.86  Thus, for example,
historians characterize the English crown’s frequent use of this form of the pardon power in the
fourteenth and fifteenth-century as a failure of justice.87  In support of this argument, historians
point to the complaints by Parliament  that such pardons “greatly encouraged” murderers,
robbers, and other felons to “offend.”88  Nevertheless, as Helen Lacy shows in the context of
general pardons  “far from opposing [its]  use . . .the Commons [in the fourteenth-century] had
been at the forefront of its evolution.”89  
 In 1377, in celebration of his fifty-year jubilee, Edward III issued a general pardon that
included in its terms pardon for “trespasses, negligences, crimes, ignorances and all other articles
of the eyre, and many other things . . .  which the punishment was a matter of fine or ransom, or
other money penalties, or else of imprisonment.”90  While Edward did not include felonies in the
grant, he did extend his grace to less serious wrongs.   The spiritual and redemptive significance
of the pardon is unmistakable.91 Speaking for the King who was too ill to attend, Bishop
92 Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, Parliament of 1377, pp. 361-16.
93 Ibid., 361-56. 
94 Ormrod, ‘Edward III’, pp. 20-26.
95 Cal. Pat. Rolls. 1381-85, p. 187.
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Houghton brought into relief the penitential ideology that undergirded  the pardon power.  In his
opening sermon, Bishop Houghton spoke to the King’s illness as a means whereby the king was
“purified from all filth of sin, if there was any,” and thus revived at God’s pleasure as His
“vessel of grace”92 Then, alluding to the concessions forced upon King by the Good Parliament,
he invited members of parliament to reconcile themselves to the King’s peace, and in so doing
receive the king’s bounty.  In response, the Commons requested the King to grant a general
pardon which “would relieve. . .  and release of all manner of debts, fines, issues, forfeitures and
amercements” for all “times past until the fiftieth year” of his reign.93  Mark Ormrod observes,
“the English crown had, in effect, adopted a secular equivalent to the plenary indulgences
offered to those pilgrims who travelled to Rome at a time of the jubilee.”94  General Pardons also
issued for felonies.  For example, in 1382 with support of Parliament, Richard II issued a general
pardon to the citizens of York which included “all insurrections, treasons, seditions, murders,
[and] felonies.”95  The import of royal mercy was woven into the fabric of English culture. 
Complaints concerning it were not directed at its propriety, but at those who abused it by not
genuinely reconciling themselves to obedience.   
Notwithstanding the canonical turn in the early thirteenth-century toward deterrence as
the justification for punishment of serious wrongs, there existed an older tradition of thought,
collected and explicated in Gratian’s Decretum, or Concordance of Discordant Canons (c.
96 Decretum Gratiani, ed. Emil Friedberg (Leipzig, 1879). 
97 Decretum, C. XXIII, q. 4, post. c. 15.
98 Ibid., Dist. 45, C. 9.
99 Ibid, Dist. 45, C. 15
100 Linda Helyar, Justice and Grace (PhD dissertation, Univ. of California at Berkeley,
1991), pp. 10-35.
101 Though C. XXIII - CXXVII has been unofficially designated the causae haereticorum
in recognition that Gratian’s discussion of the blood sanction occurs against the backdrop of his
confrontation with the problem of heresy, Sally Scully points out that subsequent commentators
treat heresy peripherally when explicating C. XXIII treating instead the question of whether
judicial killing is ever justified as the primary topic of the causa.   Sally Anne Scully, “Killing ex
officio: The Teachings of 12th and 13th century Canon Lawyers on the Right to Kill” (Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1975), p. 22. 
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1140),96 that centered its discussion of punishment upon the scriptural tenets of charity,
toleration, and mercy located in the New Testament.  The Decretum stresses a necessary
relationship between justice and mercy and praises concord as the aspirational ideal to which
men should strive.97  Quoting Pope Gregory the Great, Gratian asserts  “Discipline is not served
without mercy, nor mercy without discipline,”98 and again “true justice has compassion, false
justice disdain.”99  The question of how to reconcile justice with mercy plagued both canonists
and theologians throughout the centuries.100  In Causa XXIII of the Decretum  Gratian struggles
with the question of whether penal force or the blood sanction is an appropriate response to
wrongdoing.  Again and again Gratian returns to the New Testament injunctions to turn the other
cheek, or to replace the sword in the scabbard, as he confronts Old Testament scripture
concerning the legitimacy of penal violence.101  Notwithstanding his apparent recognition of the
conundrum that justice tethered to mercy presents, Gratian bluntly asserts in his dicta that when
one suffers wrong he ought not to revenge himself but rather that evil (mali) should be
102 Decretum, C. 23, q. 4.
103 Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory Arthur Goldhammer trans. (1981), p. 212;
Gabriel le Bras, “Le Liber de misericordia et justitia d’Alger de Liege,” Nouvella Revue
Historique de Droit Francais et Etranger (1921) pp. 80-118.
104 Decretum, C XXIII, q. 4., c. 51.
105 Ibid.,  C XXIII, q. 5.
106 Ibid, C. XXIII, q. 4, c. 35 (Homini est miserendum, peccatori est irascendum).




tolerated.102  The learned French priest Alger of Liege had written much the same at the
beginning of the twelfth-century:  “if the iniquitous [could] not be corrected, they must be
tolerated . . . The wicked must be tolerated to preserve unity.”103  Gratian, however, also quotes
Augustine for the proposition that “requital” (vindicta) that aims to “correct” a wrongdoer is not
prohibited.104
Gratian ultimately concludes that Christians are not forbidden from inflicting the blood
sanction though he strictly confines it asserting that it only loses its character as a sin when it is
imposed by the secular authority105 and when that authority acts with misericordia (with. mercy,
compassion)106 and dilectionis (with love, esteem and favor).107  The immediate and urgent
question for the modern mind, perhaps, is how the infliction of bodily torment and death upon an
offender can be understood as an act of love?  So too, in what sense is “requittal” (vindicta) by
the return of death for serious wrong a “correction” rather than annihilation of the wrongdoer?108
These questions will help frame the following discussion concerning the scholastic and mystical
reflections upon the spiritual significance of suffering in a human life.    
109 See eg. Carola Small, “The Cost of Urban Justice: The Example of Arras 1300-1329,”
Simbolo e Realta Della Vita Urbana Nel Tardo Medioevo (1988), pp. 255-261; Samuel
Edgerton, Picture and Punishment: Art and Criminal Prosecution During the Florentine 
Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985), p. 144; A. Zorzi, “The judicial system in Florence in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries,” p. 54.
110 Select Pleas of the Crown 1200 - 1225, ed. F.W. Maitland (London, Selden Soc.1888),
§ 7 (eyre of Shropshire) (Alice Critheereche, convicted of theft “deserved death but by way of
dispensation the sentence is mitigated so let her eyes be torn out.”).
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For now, it is enough to remark that when surveying the landscape of medieval criminal
procedure as a whole it is striking how little the blood sanctions were used in our period
notwithstanding the array of offenses for which some form of bodily punishment was
prescribed.109  Now in some instances the decision to forego capital punishment for a “lesser”
pain hardly appears to reflect concerns for achieving concord with an offender.  For example, in
England in the thirteenth-century maiming such as gouging out an offender’s eyes was
substituted as a “mercy” in place of hanging.110  Such punishments, it seems, irrevocably
excluded a wrongdoer from his community marking him (or her) with infamy.  Nevertheless, the
ideal of concord permeates the sources shaping penal and procedural practices alike.  Moreover,
even where blood penalties are sanctioned, one finds it justified not only on the grounds of
deterrence, but instead upon the idea of love and esteem for the condemned (cartias). 
Accordingly, asking after the intelligibility of the blood sanctions in medieval punishment
requires grappling with the question of how it conceptually fit with a criminal procedure infused
with the spirit of conciliation.  To put the question more sharply, what was the mode of thought
that allowed medieval western Europe to simultaneously embrace mercy as an attribute of justice
proper, and to nevertheless resort, however infrequently, to the wreaking of fantastic suffering
upon the body of the felon?      
111 For example, in 1272 the English bench was nearly entirely clerical.  By 1307, the
balance shifted to a little less than half.  Theodore.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the
English Common Law (Boston, 1956), p. 236.
112 G.R. Evans, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London, 2002), pp. 12-13.
113 Gauvard, De Grace Especial, p. 926; Valentin Groebner, Defaced: The Visual Culture
of Violence in the Late Middle Ages (New York, 2004), p.108 contains a reprint of Diebold
Schilling’s 1513 drawing of such an event in his Chronicle from Lucerne.
114 Ludwig von Bar, A History of Continental Criminal Law (London, 1913), p. 147;
Hanna Zaremska, Le Bannis au Moyen Age (Paris, 1996), pp. 111-114.
29
II. The Spiritualization of the Body: Punishment and Pain 
Notwithstanding the jurisdictional division between the temporal and spiritual courts,
when one looks to the beliefs, modes of experience, and ways of conceiving that shaped western
European criminal law it is difficult to contain any matter in “secular” or “religious” boxes. 
Clerics dominated the judicial benches of local and royal courts until the late thirteenth-
century.111  Analogously in the late twelfth-century the line between “sin” and “wrong” was
blurred;112 and until the mid-thirteenth-century proof was by the ordeal (i.e. iudicium Dei).  In
certain regions,  jurists held to the belief that the corpse of a victim would rise up in accusation
by bleeding or grabbing a suspect brought within its view.113 Both practices attest to the way the
miraculous was intertwined with the profane.  Throughout our period the pardon power and the
practice of sanctuary were justified in terms of spiritual categories of thought.  In the context of
punishment, penance, L’amend honorable, pilgrimage, and excommunication were penalties
common in the “secular” law on the continent.114  So too, while continental jurists drew on the
Roman law in their development of the ordo iudiciarius whereas common law jurists drew upon
ancient Germanic traditions, in both juridical traditions the discourses of  medieval theology
influenced the content and character of their work.   And finally, the ritual of the execution was
115 Karl Shoemaker, “The Problem of Pain in Punishment,” Pain, Death and the Law
(Michigan, 2001), p. 30. 
116 Esther Cohen, “The Animated Body in Pain,” American Historical Review 25 (2000)
p. 42; David B Morris, The Culture of Pain (Berkeley, 1993), p. 152-73.
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replete with spiritual imagery and iconic symbology.  
Accordingly, one must not ignore the spiritual texts when trying to glean the stores of
images and categories of thought that comprised the moral bank from which both jurists and laity
drew when interpreting the meaning and reason of punitive pain.  Thus we begin with those texts. 
Next we turn to scholastic medical discourse and to that of the jurists to see in which ways these
disciplines reflected or departed from the teachings of the theologians.  In the second section 
time is spent on the mystical reflections on pain within the fourteenth-century and the way in
which the ideal of penitential pain overlapped scholastic theology’s treatment of evil and
punishment.  In the third section, we turn to Dante’s Divine Comedy.   
A. The Rapprochement Between Soul and Body in
The Experience of Pain
In his provocative essay on The Problem of Pain in Punishment, Karl Shoemaker argues
that in seeking to understand the place of pain in medieval punishment one must grapple with the
idea, distinctive to medieval theology, that pain originates not first in the body, but in the “soul’s
striving for the good.”115  Similarly, Esther Cohen suggests that we cannot discern the
significance that medieval men and women placed upon various expressions of pain, unless we
first come to understand the way in which all “major discourses on pain – in theology, medicine,
and law – viewed ‘physical’ pain as a function of the soul.”116  Conversely, in his work on the
theological treatments of pain by the thirteenth-century Masters at Paris (1230-1300), Donald
117 D.C. Mowbray, “The Development of Ideas About Pain and Suffering in the Works of
Thirteenth Century Masters of Theology at Paris: 1230 - 1300,” (unpublished PhD thesis, Univ.
Of Bristol, 1999), p. 41.
118 However, in her article “Towards a History of European Physical Sensibility: Pain in
the Later Middle Ages,” Science in Context 8 (1995), pp. 47-74, Cohen recognizes that in the
late middle ages the human body as God’s creation also was an “expression of divine will . .
.Philopassoanism was [] predicated on a perception allowing for no dichotomy of body and
soul.” Ibid., p. 57.  Thus it is unclear why in Cohen’s discussion of pain she asserts that
theologians saw it as a function of the soul independent from physical sensation.  Cohen,
“Animated,” p. 42.  
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Mowbray argues that in the work of the theologians a “vocabulary of pain” emerged whereby
bodily pain, in whatever context, was viewed as essentially a physical experience that was
analytically distinct from operations of the rational soul.117  
In each of these historical accounts, albeit to varying degrees, the body and soul are
conceptually divided.  In Shoemaker’s account of the relationship of pain to medieval punishment
its physicality is ignored.  The blood sanction’s meaning resides in the disembodied suffering of
an isolated soul.  A similar conceptual division occurs, albeit much less starkly, in Cohen’s
work.118  In contrast, in Mowbray’s project the discussion of the theologians’ understanding of the
relationship of bodily pain to the soul is truncated leaving the impression that Aquinas and his
contemporaries viewed the soul’s relationship to bodily pain as nothing more than a biological
process of shared sensory perception.  In some sense, the soul is reduced to a functionary of the 
material. 
What these discussions overlook is the way in which medieval discourses on pain
understood it to be an experience of soul and body existing as one entity, one nature, one
substance.  Shoemaker’s account in particular implies a Platonic dualism  – that is the belief put
forth by Hugh of St. Victor and Robert Melun that person is the soul “to which the body is
119 Bonaventure, De assumptione B. Virginis Mariae, sermon 1, sect. 2, S. Bonaventurae
Opera omnia, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae,  (10 vols., Quarrachi, 1882-1902), vol. 9, p. 690. 
See also Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans., A.C. Pegis, J.F. Anderson, V.J. Bourke, & C.J.
O'Neil (4 vols., Notre Dame, 1975),  bk. 4, ch. 79, vol. 15, p. 249 where Aquinas asserts that
Plato’s idea that the soul is happiest without the body cannot be right for the soul is more like
God when it is united to the body because then it is more perfect.
120 Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, ii. 69.
121ST, 3a, q. 15, art  4. 
122Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption (New York, 1991), p. 235.
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attached as tool, garment, or prison”  – that fails to grapple with the way late thirteenth-century
belief in the composite nature of identity came to dominate theological discourse.  As
Bonaventure writes  “the person is not the soul; [she] is a composite . . .thus [Mary] must be [in
heaven] as a composite . . .; otherwise she would not be there in perfect joy.”119  For Aquinas and
his contemporaries, the soul stood to the body as form to matter.  “Body and soul are not two
actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made one substance actually
existing,”120  Accordingly, when we feel, it is the whole man who feels, neither the soul alone nor
the body alone.  Aquinas said about the suffering of Christ’s soul “soul and body are one being. 
So when the body is disturbed by some corporeal suffering, soul is of necessity disturbed
indirectly as a result . . . .”121   As Caroline Walker Bynum stresses within medieval culture the
reverse was assumed as well:
when soul is disturbed, body is disturbed. Pain and imperviousness to it happened to a
personal entity that is body and soul together.   . . .The many tales of temporary
resurrections of the dead, of corpses bleeding to accuse their murderers or sitting up to
reverence the Eucharist, of cadavers growing or smelling sweet or even excuding food
after death point to a widespread cultural assumption that person is body as well as soul,
body integrally bound with soul.122 
 Thus when enquiring into the learned discourse concerning pain, one must bear in mind that for
123 Petri, Lombardi, Sententia in IV Libris Distinctae, (2 vols, Grottaferrata, 1981), vol. 2,
bk. 3, dist. 15, ch. 1,2, pp. 92-94 (translations are my own unless indicated otherwise).
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these thinkers pain’s physical experience was intimately bound up with the condition of the soul
and that the state of the soul was bound up with pain’s physicality.  Bodily torment, in a variety
of contexts, not only signified the soul’s strife, but was itself the catalyst for the soul’s realization
of serenity.   
Theological discussions of pain in the high middle ages were wide ranging.  Questions
about the efficacy and/or necessity of bodily suffering to penance, the martyr’s ability to
withstand pain, the topology of  Hell’s torments, the fate of unbaptized children in Limbo, the
existence of evil, and the nature of the crucified Christ’s suffering all, in some way, necessitated
exploration into the nature of human suffering and the relationship between the body and the soul
in the human experience of pain.  Peter Lombard (c.1100-1160) taught at the Cathedral school at
Paris and wrote the Four Books of Sentences  around 1155.  His work was the standard textbook
of the later twelfth and thirteenth-century forming the basis of commentaries by scholastics such
as Bonaventure and Aquinas.  In the Sentences, Lombard reflected upon the nature and degree of
Christ’s suffering:
However, every sense is of the soul.  For the flesh does not feel, but the soul, using the
body like an instrument.  Whence Augustine in book XII on Genesis writes “the body
does not feel but the soul feels through the body which it uses like a messenger to confirm
in itself what itself reported on the outside.”  Therefore just as the soul sees or hears
through the body when as instrument is outside it, so even the body feels certain evils
which it would not feel without the body such as hunger, thirst and things of this sort. 
However it feels [i.e. the soul] certain things not through the body but even without the
body such as fear and things of this sort.  Therefore the soul feels pains but some through
the instrument of the body, but some not.123  
  
124 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, ed. & trans. R.E. Dyson (Cambridge,
1998), bk XXI, ch. 3, p. 1046.
125 Ibid., p. 1047.
126 Ibid.
127 Cohen, “Animated,” p.  43.
34
Peter the Lombard, as Aquinas would a century later, relied heavily upon Augustine of  Hippo. 
Concerned to explain whether a fleshy body could endure eternal torment, Augustine observed
that what must be recalled is the soul’s capacity to suffer “pain’ [dolor] while being at the same
time unable to die.124  He argues:
Moreover, if we consider the matter more diligently, we shall see that what is called
bodily pain really pertains to the soul.  For it is the soul, not the body, which feels pain,
even when the pain arises in the body, for the soul feels pain at the place where the body is
injured.  Thus just as we speak of bodies feeling and living, though the feeling and living
comes from the soul, so also do we speak of bodies suffering in pain, though no pain can
exist in the body apart from the soul.
Though Augustine seems to deny the reality of bodily pain, in the next sentence he clarifies that
the soul “suffers pain with the body in that place where something occurs to hurt it.”125  However,
the soul can also suffer pain apart from the body both when joined to it, or when it is not
“established” in the body.126  
Augustine’s argument concerning the primacy of the soul’s suffering in the experience of
bodily pain was  “known, cited, and reaffirmed for centuries to come.”127  It met with some
refinement, as in the work of  Aquinas, but essentially Augustine’s understanding of pain as an
experience of an integrated soul and body remained unchanged.  Aquinas’ discussion of pain
occurs within the first part of the second part of the Summa Theologiae, written to teach those
128 The edition used is The Summa theologica,, trans., Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (London, 22 vols.,1912-36) [hereinafter ST] .  See generally James A. Weisheipl, Friar
Thomas d’Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works (Oxford, 1975), p.219. Aquinas did not begin
his Summa until 1266. Weisheipl judges that the earliest date the second part could have been
begun was 1270.  Ibid. p. 222.  Aquinas never completed Part III.  He ceased writing in 1273
leaving his discussion of Penance unfinished.  After a mystical experience when saying Mass, he
told his secretary that he had reached the end of his writing given “that all I have written seems
to me like so much straw compared with what I have seen and with what has been revealed to
me.” Copleston, Aquinas, p. 10.  
129 ST, 1a2ae, q. 35, art. 1, Reply 2.
130 ST, 1a2ae, q., 35, art. 2, Reply.
131 Ibid art. 8, Reply; q 37, art., 4, ad. 1, 2.
35
young Dominicans who were beginners in theology.128  The second part of the Summa discusses
“the movement of rational creatures toward God.” It is in this context that Aquinas considers the
nature of pain.  He writes: “Pain is said to be bodily because the cause of pain is seated in the
body, as for instance, when one suffers something that injures the body.  But the actual movement
of pain always occurs in the soul: ‘the body cannot feel unless the soul does so too,’ as Augustine
says.”129  Though Aquinas recognizes a distinction between dolor and tristitia insofar as the first
is tied to the “exterior perception” of the body and the second to the “interior perception of the
soul,” he considers the experience of  dolor (i.e. bodily pain) to be dependent upon the manner in
which it is perceived and treated by the soul.130  Indeed, the mutual inter-penetration of body and
soul is so acute that, as Aquinas observes, anguish can so weigh down a man’s “spirits” that his
“limbs [become] immobilized” or he is deprived of speech.131    
Whereas theologians stressed the primacy of the soul in the human experience of pain,
within scholastic medical discourse the way in which bodily pain both affected and was affected
by the condition of the soul is placed in sharp relief. Those learned in medicine viewed illness and
132 Nancy Siraisi, Taddeo Alderotti and His Pupils, (Princeton, 1981), p. 224.
133 Ibid., pp. 65, 227; Salmon, Fernando, “Academic Discourse and Pain in Medieval
Scholasticism,” Medicine and Medical Ethics in Medieval and Early Modern Spain: An
Intercultural Approach, S. Kottek & Luis Garcia-Ballester eds. (Jerusalem, 1996), pp.142-143.
134 Siraisi, Taddeo Alderotti, p. 227.
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its painful afflictions as a consequence of either a disorder in the balance of “elemental qualities
(mala complexion) of the body,”  or as a result of sudden” physical change.132   In regard to pain
due to imbalance, Taddeo Alderotti (1223 -1295) who taught medicine at Bologna concurred that
the passions of the soul (accidentia anime) could deeply affect physical health and, conversely, 
that one’s physical condition could impact the soul.  The learned physician Turisanus, a pupil of
Taddeo, found the “elemental qualities in the bodies of some people to be so well balanced that
they experienced only temperate and beneficial emotions.”133  It was held too that the soul’s
condition could impact the body.  The entire range of human emotions such as joy, sadness,
anguish, anger, and shame located in accidentia anime were said by Turisanus to be the
physician’s concern for all would affect the complexio of the body.  Hence he asserted that the
experience of pleasure caused an abnormal amount of heat to radiate from the heart whereas
suppression of sensual passion could cause epilepsy in men, suffocation of the womb in women,
and kidney pain in both sexes.134  
Strikingly, within the work of  jurists one can detect the seeds of a very different
understanding of human pain.  While jurists do not question the composite nature of human
identity, there is in their work an undeniable, though nascent, commitment to a view of man as
primarily a creature whose rational soul is powerless to shape, transform, or affect the raw
experience of bodily pain.  As noted earlier, beginning in the mid-thirteenth-century, jurists
135 Gandinus, Tractatus de maleficiis, vol. 2 of Hermann Kantorowicz, Albertus Gandinus
und das Strafrecht der Scholastik (2 vols, Berlin, 1907-26), p. 52.
136 Walter Ullmann, The Medieval Idea of Law as Represented by Lucas de Penna
(London, 1946), pp. 147-149.
137 Quoted in A Zorzi, “Rituali e cerimoniali penali nelle città italiane (secc. XIII-XVI),” 
Riti e rituali nelle società medievali,  eds. J. Chiffoleau and L. Martines ( Spoleto, 1994),  p. 144.
138 John Langbein Torture and the Law of Proof (Chicago, 1977), pp. 1-25.
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increasingly justify punishment on the grounds of deterrence.  Alongside the canonists already
mentioned, Albertus Gandinus, an Italian judge during the second half of the thirteenth-century is
worthy of mention.  The first to write a treatise on criminal law, Gandinus rests his discussion on
punishment upon a single proposition: opus est exemplo ut pena unius sit metus multorum.135
The purpose of punishment is to instill dread.  Lucas de Penna, fourteenth-century judge and
jurist repeats much the same in his commentary upon the Codex.136  And when we reach the
fifteenth-century, the same utilitarian ideal is put forth by the jurist Angelo Gambiglioni who
writes in his Tractatus de maleficiis that corporeal punishment should “provoke such dread that
those who witness it should fall speechless.”137  Implicit in such assertions is a emergent
materialism whereby the human being is conceived of as primarily a creature who, on the basis of
what Aquinas calls servile fear, will react to avoid the experience of bodily pain. Gone from these
juridical works is the scholastic theologian’s belief in the primacy of the rational soul that directs
and informs the body’s experience of pain.
This is not to say that jurists altogether denied the import of the soul in the experience of
pain. Judicial torture became a fixture of criminal procedure on the continent in the thirteenth
century as a consequence of Lateran IV’s prohibition of clerical involvement in proof by
ordeal.138
139 Cohen, “Animated,” p. 50.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Piero Fiorelli, La Tortura giudiziaria nel diritto comune (2 vols, Milano, 1953-54),
vol. 1, pp. 186-189.
143 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 218-23.
144 Reproduced in Caroline Bynum, “Violent Imagery in Late Medieval Piety,” GHI
Bulletin 30 (2002), p. 7, plate 9.
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Torture, or quaestio, was defined as “an inquisition performed in order to extract the truth by way
of torment and bodily pain.”139  Some jurists, however, asserted that tormentum derived from
torguere mentem meaning to torture the mind.140  Others substituted “cordis (heart’s) for corporis
(body’s)  dolor since the suffering of the soul was considered an integral part of torture.”141 
Jurists asserted “torture . . .can be called agony of soul and body for the extraction of truth.”142  So
too,  jurists were  persuaded that resistance to confession under torture could result from
witchcraft which prevented the one being tortured from sensing pain.143  
Yet what jurists do not discuss is impassibility, the widespread belief that those with a pure
and innocent soul will remain unaffected by bodily torment.  Though a frequent theme in the art of
the high middle ages as in, for example, The Martyrdom of St. Agatha from 1473, where the saint
seems almost self-satisfied in her imperviousness to her grisly-erotic torture,144 jurists remain silent
about the possibility that the innocent soul under penal torture might escape the experience of pain. 
Jurists do acknowledge that individuals may vary in their capacity to endure pain as exemplified
by the general rule that women were to be tortured before men “because the man has greater
constancy and will take longer to confess, and the woman will do so faster, for her heart is sudden
145 Repetito super materia quaestionum sive toturarum, attributed to Bartolus of
Sassoferrato, Omnia quar extant opera (11 vols.,Venice, 1615), 10, fol. 250 cited in Cohen,
“Animated,” p. 51.
146 ST, 2a2ea, q. 19, a. 3, reply.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 ST, 1a2ea, q. 35, art. 7, Reply.
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and inconstant.”145  Yet, such variance is understood to have little to do with the commitments of
thought within the realm of the rational soul.  In some sense, biological instinct is given primacy
over the freedom of the will residing in the higher functions of the soul. 
Much could be said about the seeming divide between the jurists, on the one hand, and the
theologians and learned in medicine, on the other, concerning the nature of human identity that is
implied by each discipline’s discussions of pain.  It suffices now to merely highlight one aspect of
that divide.  The juridical commitment to deterrence and to the use of torture presupposes that pain
is an experience of harm from which any sane person will recoil.  It is on the basis of this
assumption that torment or the threat of death is thought to be efficacious.  Now in Aquinas’
discussion of servile fear, he recognizes that men will “shrink from detriment to their own
body.”146  Yet, he carefully notes that to forsake “justice on that account is contrary to natural
reason.”147  Man contains “the natural image of God” within the higher parts of his soul which
graces him with the capacity to discount pain in the name of the right.148  Moreover, writes
Aquinas,  bodily pain could in some circumstances be a source of “inward joy”149  This idea
repeats in Dante’s Divine Comedy.  The penitents on the mount of Purgatory speak of their intense
agonies as “solace” (Purg. XXIII, l 71).  A similar, though not identical,  proposition found
150 Merback, The Thief, pp. 155-156.
151 ST. Supplement, q. 90, art. 3, Reply.
152 Caroline Walker Bynum, “Why all the Fuss About the Body? A Medieval
Perspective,” Critical Inquiry 22 (1985), pp. 14-15.
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popular expression in the context of the blood sanction. In a woodcut designed by Wolfgang
Katzheimer for the municipal law code,  Bambergerische Halsgerichtsordnung there is depicted a
judicial procession out of the prison where a man in shackles is led by officials toward, one may
assume, the place of his execution.  He is attended by a friar with a crucifix and above the
participants’ heads is a banderole with the words: “If you bear your pain patiently / it shall be
useful to you/ Therefore give yourself to it willing.”150  The presence of this drawing on a mundane
municipal code suggests that in some way medieval men and women understood scourging,
maiming, or decapitation to be a spiritual good for the condemned.  The question is, of course,
how could bodily suffering contribute to one’s joy – a word used by medieval theologians in the
very particular sense of bliss.151
B. Pain as an Attribute of Love
We have taken time to stress that the physical body of man, as well as his soul, was
spiritually significant to his experience of bodily pain.  One reason for pressing that matter reveals
itself now.  As Caroline Bynum’s work emphasizes, “extravagant attention to flesh . .
.characteristic of the period is not ‘flight from’ [the body] so much as ‘submersion in.’”152  Though
most medieval men or women were not directly in touch with Aquinas’ idea of hylomorphism, the
practices of the devout which were admired and venerated by the culture reflected a belief in the
body as a means to spiritual concord with God. 
153 Ibid; Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, pp. 14-21
154 R.W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven, 1959), pp. 231-40.  On
the importance of the Eucharist and the way in which imagery of Christ’s wounds dominated
host saluations see Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late Medieval Culture
(Cambridge, 1991), pp. 1-25, 303.  
155 Margery, Kempe, The Book of Margery Kempe, trans. Lynn Staley (New York, 2001),
ch. 35, pp. 86-89
156 Bynum, Holy Feast, p. 246.
157 Angela of Foligno, Le Livre de l’experience des vrais fidèles: Texte latin publié
d’après le manuscrit d’Assise, trans. and ed.  M-J Ferré and L. Baudry (Paris, 1927). 
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Within medieval religious consciousness, the ideal of imitatio Christi and teachings of
penitential purgation provide a focal point for the culture’s understanding of bodily pain as an
affirmative good.153   The two acts are profoundly related to each other.  In each, the tormented and
bleeding body is seen as providing access to the divine, while at the same time signifying the
soul’s struggle to find repose. 
1. Imitatio Christi        
 In part the flesh became a vessel for communion because Christ’s humanity became 
such a central theme in late medieval piety.154  Thus in Margery Kempe’s visions she held Christ in
bed and boldly stroked his toe.155  Angela of Foligno, Adelheid Langmann, and Catherine of Siena
married Christ in eucharistic visions.  Bynum writes, “underlining the extent to which the marriage
was a fusion with Christ’s physicality, Adelheid received the host as a pledge rather than a
wedding ring, while Catherine received . . . the ring of Christ’s foreskin.”156  And Angela Foligno
was driven to such longing, that in penitence she disrobed before the crucifix and offered her
naked body to Christ with a promise of  “perpetual chastity.”157  
158 Georges Duby, The Age of the Cathedrals: Art and Society 980-1420, trans. E.
Levieux & B. Tompson  (Chicago, 1981), pp. 107-08. 
159 Examples are abundant. The “Man of Sorrows,” ca. 1430, by Meister Francke, now in
Hamburg, is a startling beautiful image of the suffering Christ, who appears as judge, lover, and
sacrificial victim.  Jeffrey Hamburger, The Visual and the Visionary: Art and Female Spirituality
in Late Medieval Germany (New York, 1998), p. 375.  On the extent to which Passion
narratives, which informed painting, reached a large lay audience see Thomas Bestul, Texts of
the Passion: Latin Devotional Literature and medieval Society (Philadelphia, 1996), pp. 7-10.
160 L. Gougaud, Devotional and Ascetic Practices in the Middle Ages trans. G.C. Bateman
(London, 1927), pp. 80-91; D Gray, “The Five Wounds of Christ,” Notes and Queries 208
(1963), pp 84-87; Rubin, Corpus Christi, pp. 302-304; Richard Kieckhefer, Unquiet Souls:
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The collective turn toward Christ’s humanity engendered in medieval piety an intense
focus upon His suffering during the Passion.  In the visual arts images of Christ sitting in judgment
were supplanted by those of a crucified Jesus.158  By the fourteenth-century, sculptors, painters,
poets, and playwrights centred their best efforts on detailing the Man of Sorrows in all of his
agony.159  The reflections of the schoolmen such as Lombard, Aquinas and Bonaventure in the
twelfth and thirteenth-century upon the suffering human Jesus found expression within the
devotional  practices of fourteenth-century European culture   –  a culture keenly aware that the
redemption of humanity from eternal death hinged on pain.  In the Book of Hours and in drawings
upon amulets, which were popular in the late middle ages, depictions of Christ’s body focused
upon the bleeding and suffering flesh of the Passion.160  In the early fourteenth-century, in private
prayer books and in votive masses in missals, devotion to the wounds becomes prevalent.161          
It was in co-suffering with Christ’s lacerated bleeding body that pious medieval men and
women most dramatically sought to inhere in his humanity.  Between 1200 - 1500, religious
practices such as fasting, eucharistic frenzy, self-mutilation, or the experience of stigmata
162 Bynum, Holy Feast, p. 246.
163 Ibid. p. 251.
164 Julian of Norwich, Showings trans. James Walsh (London, 1878), p.126.  All
references to Julian’s Long Text are from this translation.  (Hereinafter LT).
165 Bynum Holy Feast,  p. 246.
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frequently involved excruciating pain. Yet, rather than representing an attempt to escape the flesh, 
such acts were directed at realizing the “opportunity of physicality.”162  The body not only
provided a gateway to the divine.  It possessed spiritual significance in its own right:
Late medieval theology . . .taught that at the central moment of Christian ritual, the
moment of consecration, God became food-that-is-body. . . In becoming flesh God takes on
humanity and that humanity saves, not by being but by being broken.  The food on the altar
was thus for all Christians a symbol both of assimilation and of rending.  To eat was to
consume God . . . and to eat was also to rend and tear God. . .It was only by bleeding, by
being torn and rent, by dying, that God’s body redeemed humanity.  To become that body
by eating was therefore to bleed and to save – to lift one’s own physicality into suffering
and into glory.163        
In the fourteenth-century, holy women such as Julian of Norwich prayed for “every kind of
pain, bodily and spiritual . . .every fear and assault from devils” in order that she may become
closer to Christ in his suffering.164   Both Margaret of Ypres’s self-flagellation and Columba of
Rieti’s food asceticism, which culminated in her starving herself to death at the age of thirty-four
attested, paradoxically, to the way in which bodily suffering born of physical deprivation or bodily
affliction “released torrents of bodily energy toward God.”165  The experience of bodily pain not
only signified the sufferer’s longing to be near to her saviour.  It provided medieval men and
women with a locus of redemption and did so by the very fact of its physicality.  Abstract thoughts
by virtue of man’s being a limited being must be “clothed” in words or images to achieve actuality
166 Dante Alighieri, De Vulgari Eloquentia,. trans. A.G. Ferrers Howell (London, 1973),
I, 3, 1-2.
167 Nancy Lindhein, “Body, Soul and Immortality: Some Readings in Dante’s
Commedia,” Modern Language Notes 105 (1990), p. 14.
168 Shoemaker, “The Problem of Pain,” p.29.
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writes Dante.  Man’s understanding  is obliged to corporealize meaning.166  The body, as the
drapery of the soul (vesta is Dante’s constant metaphor in the Divine Comedy), provided man with
a way to encounter meaning.167      
It would seem that it could be no other way for a culture dominated by a religion whose
central tenet was that humanity had been redeemed by a Divinity that choose to become flesh and
to suffer human torment and death.  Redemption meant precisely this: that one partook in joy by
being returned home to the shelter of His arms.  The body, by the teaching of the Atonement and
Resurrection, was the means by which home would again be realized.  More than this, however,
the sacrificial pain of the body condemned to die signified that one already dwelled, and had
always dwelled, within His shelter. Penetrating the sense and reason of this last idea necessitates
enquiring into the theologians’ and mystics’ treatment of evil and its relation to the soul’s
experience of pain.  
2. On  Evil and the Torment of Being   
As Shoemaker observes, lurking in the background of medieval discourses on pain was the
question of how suffering (and I would add sin) could exist in a world created by an absolutely
good Deity?168  The answer put forth by theologians and mystics mattered deeply to the question of
how medieval culture justified corporeal and capital punishment. 
The question of theodicy imposed itself upon the scholastics with grave urgency.  Standing
169 Anselm of Canterbury, “The Fall of the Devil,” Three Philosophical Dialogues, trans.
Thomas Williams (Cambridge, 2002).
170 Thomas Aquinas, On Evil, trans. Richard Regan (Oxford, 2003).
171 Ibid., p. 14.
172 Ibid., A. 3, Response, p. 28-30.
173 Ibid., A. 1, Response, p.6; Reply 20, p. 10.
174 Augustine, Confessions and Enchiridion, trans. A.C. Outler (1955) Enchiridion ch. 11:
“For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good?  In the bodies of animals, disease
and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for when a cure is effected, that does not
mean that the evils . . . namely, the disease and wounds - go away from the body and dwell
elsewhere: they altogether cease to exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance but a defect
in the fleshy substance.” 
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as a portal to the twelfth-century, Anselm of Canterbury  treats the question of evil in his treatise
De casu diaboli.169  A little more than a hundred and fifty years later Aquinas writes De Malo
(1265-1268).170  These two works represent an unbroken continuity of thought about the
ontological status of evil that stretches back to Augustine and Plotinus.  For Aquinas “evil”
(malum) bears a more inclusive sense than the word does for us today including within its
definition the idea of  “hurt,” “misdeed,” and “misfortune.”171  In accord with the philosophical
tradition of his time, Aquinas divides evil into the two broad categories of suffering  (malum
poenae)  and moral wrong (malum culpae).172
In asking after the relationship of both kinds of evil to an absolutely good Deity, both
Anselm and Aquinas begin by enquiring into what sort of thing evil is.  In both its active and
passive sense, both men conclude evil is no-thing for it lacks esse.173    In this they follow
Augustine.174  Rather than being anything actual, says Aquinas, evil is a lack – an absence of a
good that ought to be present.  Hence, it is not evil that stones lack sight, for sight is not what the
175 ST., 1a, q. 5, a. 48, 3.
176 Anselm, “The Fall of the Devil,” ch. IX, p. 69.
177 Denise Nowakowski Baker, Julian of Norwich’s Showings (Princeton, 1994), p. 3.
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Deity naturally intends for a stone.  Yet, for a man to lack sight is evil for he ought to see.175  The
same can be said of moral evil.  It is a privation in that it represents the absence of man’s  right
relation to law (qua right) which he ought to have by virtue of his status as a law-worthy being. 
Writes Anselm,  “when [humans] abandoned that rectitude, it lost something great and received in
its place nothing but its privation which has no essence and which we call injustice.”176
Fourteenth-century mystic and anchoress, Julian of Norwich, agrees. In the last quarter of
the fourteenth-century, she composed a book that detailed her visionary experience of the Passion. 
Little is known about her except what she herself relates in her Book of Showings.  While Margery
Kempe’s account of her visit with Julian suggests her regional reputation as a holy woman, the
small number of extant manuscripts of her Showings indicates that the book did not circulate
widely.177   Nonetheless, her writing suggests a wide and learned acquaintance with the devotional
and theological traditions of her day.178  Thus her work tells us something about the way affective
spirituality in the fourteenth-century encountered the subject of pain.  
Julian’s vision occurred in her thirtieth year as she lay near to death in Norwich.179 On the
eighth day of her illness a priest was called to her bedside.  He held a crucifix before the dying
woman’s eyes and suddenly, she tells us, her pain diminished.  Through the rest of the day and
night she experienced a series of miraculous visions which centred upon Christ’s suffering.  Once
180 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of divine love, translated from British Library
Additional MS 37790, trans.  Frances Beer ( Rochester, NY,1998).  All citation to the Short Text
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she recovered, she quickly wrote down the content of her sixteen visions which has come down to
us as the Short Text.180  She  spent twenty years pondering their meaning. She then wrote an
expanded version of her book known as the Long Text.  
Julian understood her grave illness and vision to be God’s response to her prayer for three
gifts sometime prior to May 1373.
I desired three graces by the gift of God.  The first was to have recollection of Christ’s
passion.  The second was a bodily sickness and the third was to have, of God’s gift, three
wounds . . .the wound of contrition, the wound of compassion, and the wound of longing
with my will for God.181         
She sought acute physical and spiritual pain as a means to deepen her awareness of her own
sinfulness and to bring her closer to the Son and Father.  Like the scholastics, Julian wished to
understand why evil (i.e. suffering and sin) is necessary in a world created by an absolutely good
Deity?  She begins, as they do, by seeking to discern what sort of thing evil is. She writes in the
Short Text: “O wretched sin, what are you?  You are nothing.  For I saw that God is in everything;
I did not see you . . . I am certain that you are nothing.”182  
For theologians such as Anselm and Aquinas and mystics such as Julian, and in conformity
with the traditions in which they wrote,183 evil’s character as privation signified that ultimately it
184 Aquinas, On Evil, A.2, Response, p. 13; Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 34, c. 4, n. 1-2.
185 Ibid.
186 ST 1a2a, q., 35, art. 6, reply.
187 LT, ch 14, p. 53.
188 Aquinas, On Evil, A. 2, Response, p. 15.
189 LT, ch 14, 63.
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“cannot exist except in good”: evil is parasitic and requires the existence of good (being) in order
that it may corrupt it.184  Put differently, as a privation, evil can exist only in a being and since all
being, as created by the Deity, is good, evil can deform, corrupt, and twist the good, but it can
never completely triumph over it for to eradicate the good completely would be to eradicate
itself.185  Thus, says Aquinas, “it is impossible to find anything totally evil.”186  Similarly writes
Julian, in each soul “there is a godly will which never assented to sin nor ever will.”187  There are
of course differences of thought within the individual traditions that these thinkers represent.  Yet
what they share is a vision of evil as a chosen (in the case of moral fault) or as a given (in the case
of endured suffering) perversion of the subject’s intended actuality.  In the context of the
wrongdoer who commits himself to evil, Aquinas and Julian both taught that no matter the quality
of the evil it was impotent to eradicate the essential goodness (understood as “potentiality to
perfection” ) that inheres in being.188  
At the centre of this thought is an understanding of spiritual anguish both as a good and as
constitutive of the human condition.   “Sin,” writes Julian is the “cause of all this pain.”  She is not
speaking morally, but ontologically.  When the human being commits wrong, he acts in
“opposition to [his] fair nature.”189  As a consequence, Aquinas writes, he causes “disorder” within
190 ST 2a2ae, q. 87, a..6, ad. 3.
191 LT, ch 14, p. 51.
192  ST 1a2ae, q. 35, Reply.
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his soul.190  The wrongdoer is alienated from his deepest self and thus is thrown into discord
between who he is in himself and what he is for himself.   This condition of self-estrangement,
says Julian, causes pain.191  Though Aquinas asserts that “awareness” of one’s union to evil is a
necessary condition of the soul’s experience of pain,192  the belief was common in the late middle
ages that the corruption of evil inflicted a spiritual wounding even upon those who mistook evil for
an apparent good.  What such pain testifies to is the thwarting of man’s natural desire for the good
– for Julian the longing of the godly will that cannot be tempted to sin, and for Aquinas the
essential being of man that evil cannot obliterate.
Yet, so too, pain accompanies man’s seeking of the good.  In response to St Catherine of
Siena’s petition to be purged of her sin, God revealed to her: “In loving me, you come to know
more of my truth, and the more you know, the more intolerable pain and sorrow you will feel when
I am offended.”193  There is in man’s love for the good nothing but immense suffering, for in his
longing to unify with the good the human being becomes starkly aware of his inadequacy and
imperfection.  He despises his sins.  He feels unsuitable and insufficiently pleasing to his maker. 
Accordingly, the Deity explains to Catherine, “suffering and sorrow increase in proportion to love. 
When love grows, so does sorrow.”194  
Within this tradition, the converse was also true: when sorrow grows, so does love.  Julian
195 LT, ch 13, p. 39.
196  Ibid.
197 Ibid., ch 14, p. 61
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writes,  “sin is the sharpest scourge with which any chosen soul can be struck . . .it makes a man
despicable in his own sight so much at times he thinks himself that he is not fit for anything but as
it were to sink into hell . . .”195  It is through such anguish, says Julian, that men and women
develop the wounds of contrition, compassion, and longing for God.  Through both spiritual and
bodily affliction, one becomes receptive to “God’s mercy.”196  Indeed she sees the Fall, and hence
pain, as necessary, for “if we did not fall we should not know how feeble and wretched we are in
ourselves” and thus the wonder and boundlessness of “the love of our creator.”197  Pain brings man
to his knees.  In so doing, “it purges and makes us know ourselves and ask for mercy.”198  In terms
of medieval Christian metaphysics the soul’s suffering signifies the human longing to dwell in
unity with the Divine.  Given that such longing is itself a good, so too suffering contains an
admixture of good.  In the context of bodily suffering, pain opened a way for the soul to come to
self-realization and thus to dwell in repose with the Good.
3. Penal Pain as the Affirmation of Being 
Though Julian of Norwich does not write of punishment, in reflecting upon the meaning of
human pain, she emphasizes its power to effect a reunion between man and God by bringing him –
through torment – to a knowledge of the boundlessness of divine mercy.  Begun as a theodicy
Julian’s Showings culminates as a vision about human redemption.  Within Aquinas the ways in
which the subjects of pain, evil, punishment, and human redemption overlap and shade into each
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other is more explicit.  
In a way similar to the visionary saints, Aquinas sees the bodily suffering of the wrongdoer 
as a means by which the disquiet and discord within his soul is ameliorated.  Though Aquinas
writes that punishment may be seen as an evil for those punished,199 so too, it is also potentially a
good for the wrongdoer.200  Through “pain” and “penance” punishment “reduces” a wrongdoer to
“order.”201  This is true even when the offender suffers death.  “The death inflicted by the judge
profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it
profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any
more.”202  Expiation represents more in Aquinas than the simple removal from the wrongdoer of “a
kind of advantage  gained” by preferring his own will above the requirements of the law which, by
being removed, erases punishment’s debt.203  Following Aristotle, Aquinas everywhere speaks of
punishment qua pain as a “kind of medicine” or remedy which will “cure” and “heal” the
discordant will of the wrongdoer.204  As scholars of Aquinas note, he understood the essence of
punishment to be the subjection of an offender to something contrary to his will.205  The bodily
pain inflicted stands as metaphor for the thwarting of the desire for evil understood in the medieval
206 ST, 1a2ae, q.64, a. 2, ad. 3.
207 Ibid..
208 ST, 1a2ae, q. 87, a. 7, Reply.
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sense as the absence of good.  
To understand how such thwarting (which is experienced as pain) cures or remedies the
wrongdoer one needs to recall the status of evil’s ontological reality as no-thing.  In the context of
medieval Christian metaphysics, punishment – as a suppression of the will to evil (malum culpae)
–  is the negation of negation.  In the doing of wrong “man departs from the order of reason, and
consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood.”206  He reduces himself to a “beast of
servitude” slavishly choosing to do what pleases him rather than what he ought.207  Thus, in that
the wrongdoer’s will to evil is thwarted, his ontological reality as a being (qua good) is reaffirmed. 
The “bitterness” of the medicine “restores him to health.”208   This is no less true in those cases
where the punishment inflicted is death for as an act of repression of the offender’s wayward will
he is restored to the order of justice which is his true dwelling place.  “Now hatred of a person's
evil is equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to charity.”209  It is at
this point that we may recall Gratian’s judgment that even in the infliction of death, one must (and
indeed can) act out of love.
 Aquinas, at times, speaks as a utilitarian whereby the evil of physical punishment to a
wrongdoer is outweighed by the benefit of removing a corrupted limb from the body politic.210  So
too, he explicitly allows for deterrence writing that the hanging of thieves serves as an example to
211 ST 1a2ae, q. 87, a. 1, ad 2.
212 Aquinas, On Evil, A. 5, Response, p. 36.(“nothing should have that of which it is
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others.211  Occasionally he at times speaks of retributio not as an ordering of the discord both
external and internal to the wrongdoer, but rather as a “withdrawal” of God in recognition that the
offender is “undeserving.”212  Yet when his insistence upon the potentially medicinal character of
punishment is considered in the context of his discussion of evil, the reader is prompted to ponder
the way in which scholastic culture viewed punitive pain – including the blood sanction – as that
which both heals and affirms the wrongdoer in his status as a person.  Indeed, “mercy [even]
appears in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in
them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.”213
Although punitive pain signifies an affirmation of the wrongdoer’s personhood, Aquinas
stresses that whether its medicinal potential is realized depends upon the wrongdoer’s stance
toward the pain he suffers.  When a wrongdoer voluntarily undertakes his punishment it takes on
the character of a “satisfaction” and thus “loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the
nature of punishment is to be against the will.”214  In its character as a satisfaction, punitive pain 
becomes a conduit for the soul’s movement toward health and joy.  Nonetheless, the experience of
pain remains an agony for those undergoing it.  So too, it follows from Aquinas’ thought that while
an offender may resent and recoil from his punishment, it remains an act that confirms him in that
it strikes to counter the evil that attacks his status as a being.     
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The preceding discussion suggests a kinship between the Fourteenth-century mystical
saints’ devotional reflections upon redemptive pain and the discourse of thirteenth-century
scholastic theologians such as Aquinas upon the nature of punishment.  Nowhere is the stuff and
matter of this kinship more richly detailed than in the poetry of Dante Alighieri (1265 - 1321).     
C. The Divine Comedy
Without entering into the debate about whether the notion of “a” medieval mind is or is not
a fiction,215 what can be said in the context of Dante is that his “imagination work[ed] habitually
within [the] system . . .of theology and cosmology of the Middle Ages” giving to the abstractions
of scholastic thinking bodily form.216  Moreover, as scholars of the Comedy well recognize, “Dante
came to maturity when the most sweeping and exciting intellectual revolution of the Middle Ages
had just crested.”217  The years 1190 to 1250 witnessed the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle,218
the spreading of courtly love throughout the courts of Europe,219 the availability of such literary
Snith, The Expansion and Transformation of Courtly Literature (Athens, GA 1980).
220 Dante, Inferno, p. 12 (introduction). 
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models as Virgil’s Aeneid and Ovid’s Metamorphoses, and finally the comprehensive treatment of
theology in a summa.  Dante was, “the heir and product of this intellectual ferment.”220 
Dante was born in Florence in 1265 where he spent his life until 1302 taking a leading role
in politics and in the intellectual life of his city.  In 1302 he was perpetually exiled from his
beloved city for allegedly engaging in acts hostile to the Church.  Scholars agree that the Inferno
was published around 1314, the Purgatorio shortly thereafter and the Paradiso in 1320.221  The
work is inspired by Beatrice, a woman whom historians know little about other than Dante’s
ardour for her. In a letter to Can Grande, to whom Dante dedicates the Paradiso, he sets out the
aim and subject of the Comedy.  The subject of the work “according to the letter alone” is “simply
a consideration of the state of souls after death,” he writes.222  But if one considers the work’s
“allegorical meaning, the subject is man, liable to the reward or punishment of justice, according
as through the freedom of the will he is deserving or undeserving.”223  
As Michael Smith suggests in his penetrating essay Punishment in the Divine Comedy there
exists a scholarly understanding of the relationship between pain and punishment in the Comedy
that seems obvious given its congeniality to the current Anglo-American view of punishment.224 
225 Armour, Peter, "Dante's contrapasso: Contexts and Texts," Italian Studies 55 (2000),
pp. 1-20
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In the modern view, the pains of Hell and Purgatory within the Comedy represent externally
imposed sufferings that God inflicts upon wrongdoers as a retribution.  The poem, in places,
suggests such a reading.  During their journey through Hell, Dante and Virgil repeatedly remark
upon the ways in which God works his “vengeance” (Inf. Canto 28, l. 142, Canto 9, l. 88-90,
Canto 14, l. 16-18).  In Purgatory, Dante speaks of punishment as “payment” of a “debt” (Purg.
Canto 10, l. 106-108, canto 11, l. 88, canto 23,  l. 14-15).  And in the eighth circle of Hell, the
sower of discord Bertran de Born explains that the division of his head from his trunk represents
“counter-suffering” for the division he caused between a young king and his son (Inf. Canto 28,
142).225  In regard to deterrence, it seems evident that Dante wrote, in part, to warn his reader. 
That he sought to achieve this end through the use of terror, whereby the reader who learned of the
torments that awaited the sinner after death would be frightened into changing his path, seems
evident from the manner in which both Dante and Virgil react to the torments they witness as they
travel through Hell.  Nonetheless, as Smith argues, there exists another understanding of the
meaning of penal pain in Dante’s work that while difficult to discern is truer to his thought.  
The souls in Hell and Purgatory suffer spiritual pain awaiting Judgment Day to be reunited
with their bodies. Thus, at first blush,  Dante’s work may appear to have little to say about the way
in which Christian medieval European culture conceived of the relationship between the body and
soul in the context of the wrongdoer who suffered punishment.  Yet, throughout the poem (and
putting aside the theological puzzle of how a disembodied soul suffers bodily pain), the images of
the bodily sufferings of the damned and the penitent speak to the souls’ unquenchable need for
their bodies to fully be at home with the Good.  So intense is the soul’s need of the body that when
226 Lindheim, “Body, Soul,” p. 14.
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deprived of it by death, the soul immediately “imprints” its body upon the air (Purg. Canto
XXV).226  Though in Paradise the spirits are said to be luci rather than ombre, they “plainly
showed their desire for their dead bodies” (Par. Canto IV, l. 60-64).  And in Dante’s recognition of
Beatrice where he exclaims to Virgil that “not a drop of blood is left in me that does not tremble: I
know the tokens of the ancient flame” one is inescapably drawn to the way in which sexual
passion is sublimated into the “symbol” of ordered love that Beatrice represents (Purg. Canto
XXX, LL. 46-48).227  The material world of sight and sound, of bodily perception and experience,
is a  necessary condition of man’s realization of his redemption.
In Dante’s rendering of the pains of Hell what he presents his reader is not a place of
externally imposed suffering.  Indeed, Gross reminds us that while Bertran in Canto XXVIII of the
Inferno describes his pain as a contrapasso for his sin, the reader knows by now that “even the
most eloquent of the damned have major blind spots” in their understanding.228  Rather, the
damned suffer the vileness of their sin – a sin to which they remained committed up to their time
of death.  Indeed, they “are eager to cross the river [Acheron], for divine justice so spurs them that
fear turns to desire” (Inf. Canto 3, ll 121-126).  Even after death the damned pursue their vice. 
And it is the pain inherent to this commitment that the damned feel.  For example, in the circle of
the wrathful who endure the pain of being submerged in black mud, the damned see a likeness
between their present and their earthly state.  The wrathful wail “we were sullen in the sweet air
that is gladdened by the sun, bearing in our hearts a sluggish smoke, now we are sullen in the black
229 Smith, Punishment, p. 553; Dorothy Sayer, Introductory Papers on Dante (London,
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mire” (Inf. Canto VII, ll 115-126).  The lustful are whirled by tempests, the violent immersed in
hot blood, and hypocrites wear robes gilded on the outside but crushing within.  In each case the
correspondence between the damneds’ suffering and their sin refers not to a punishment that is
imposed upon them by an angry god, but rather to an aspect of the sin itself.229  
Dante’s imagery vividly renders the medieval Catholic teaching that sin diseases the soul,
twisting, corrupting, and tormenting it by its very presence.  The pain the soul suffers in Hell for
sin is in some way a “continuation of the condition of sinfulness on earth.”230  The only difference
is that the intellectual powers are strengthened after death and thus, in accord with the teachings of
medieval theology, the damned souls suffer no more than they did on earth.  Rather, their
experience of sin is no longer veiled by misleading appearance: in Hell they know sin for what it
is.
There is another sort of pain in Hell. By committing themselves to vice, the punished are
divided within themselves for they thwart the soul’s natural desire for the good.  The damneds’
grief springs from their loss of “the good of the intellect” (Inf. Canto 3, ll. 17-18).  As Virgil
explains to his charge, “each [man, woman and child] confusedly apprehends a Good in which his
spirit may be quieted, and desires it, and therefore each strives to reach it” (Purg. Canto 17, ll 127-
129).  Yet though born “to form the angelic butterfly” able to fly to justice unimpeded, the sinner
instead “bend[s]” his “sight on emptiness” thereby becoming “like defective vermin” (Purg. Canto
X, ll. 127-130, Par. Canto IX, ll 10-12).  By choosing to remain committed to their sin, the
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primordial desire of the damned to return home to their creator is thwarted.  This thwarting is
Hell’s primary pain. One hears echoes of Julian of Norwich’s vision of the “godly will.”  So too
Dante follows Aquinas in envisioning penal pain as signifying the “pain of loss” of the “immutable
good.”231  In some way, Smith suggests, the pain of the damned signifies that God remains present
and near.  The acute sense of loss of the Good that comprises the soul’s agony reflects God’s love
for, as Smith writes, by “preserving in them the good desire which is the source of their pain,” God
does not allow them to fall even further to evil thereby extinguishing their being.232 
Purgatory is different from Hell.  Unlike the damned, the souls in Purgatory joyfully
embrace the pain of their penances.  And their pains are not eternal.  After a period of time in
Purgatory the souls will enter Paradise.  Yet, as Smith observes,  in critical ways Hell and
Purgatory are akin to each other.  In both places souls experience pain.  And in some instances the
souls in Purgatory are led to experience the essential truth of their sin as are the damned in Hell. 
Thus, as are the wrathful in Hell, souls who are purging the sin of anger are blinded by black, acrid
smoke.  In Hell the hypocrites wear gilded coats of lead which burden them and in Purgatory the
prideful are bent to the ground under heavy loads (Purg. Canto 10, ll. 115-120, 130-139).233  What
distinguishes one place from the other rests then not so much in the idea of lesser or more severe
degrees of pain, but rather in the condition of the soul that experiences the pain.  Recall Aquinas’
distinction between suffering as punishment (i.e. evil) or as satisfaction. Smith suggests, that what
is at stake in the experience of pain in Purgatory is the soul’s undergoing both the thwarting of
234 Ibid.  
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sinful disposition – which remains even after a particular sin has been forgiven – and the pain of
not yet being fit to present oneself before God which those in Purgatory so eagerly wish to do.234 
Thus Umberto on the Cornice of the Proud tells Date, “I was son to a great Tuscan - Guglielmo
Aldobrandeschi was my father.”  He sheepishly adds “I don’t know if you ever heard of him.  I am
here to make satisfaction for my insolent pride of race” (Purg. Canto 11, ll. 58-60).
In both Hell and Purgatory then Dante imagines the torments of punishment as not good in
themselves, but nevertheless as signs of the Good that dwells eternally, albeit besmirched, within
the human soul of the wrongdoer.  Referring to the moment when the soul was created, Dante tells
his reader “but your life the Supreme Beneficence breaths forth immediately, and He so enamours
it of Himself that it desires Him ever after” (Par. Canto VII, l. 139).  Dante renders poetically the
teaching adhered to by the schoolmen and those beset of an affective piety.  Even for those in Hell,
within man lives a “godly will” which never “assents to sin.”  Thus ripped from its right
relationship to the Good, by its own choice to pursue lesser or merely apparent goods, the soul
suffers.  And yet, so too, with a disposition inclined toward other than the Good, the soul that turns
back to right relations also suffers for desires that conflict with seeking the good are thwarted. 
What binds each thinker to the other, whether poet, theologian, or mystic, is the abiding
belief that, in the words of Dante, “”The glory of Him who moveth everything, which is God, doth
shine in every corner of the Universe but in one part more and in another less” according “to the
virtue of the recipients.”235  Read collectively, these texts offer an understanding of penal pain that
ties the figurative and the literal suffering of the body to the soul’s yearning for both the true Good
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and merely apparent goods.  For the wrongdoer, the experience of violence done to his being will
be eagerly sought or fearfully endured depending upon the commitments of his soul.  But in all
cases, the pain that pierces that soul is, at its nub, a sign of God’s presence and of the wrongdoer’s
essential goodness (however veiled) for even at his vilest moment he is a being created by God. 
Moreover, the wrongdoer’s bodily suffering is ameliorating: by negating the negation that is evil,
penal pain affirms his status as a worthy being.  
III. The Good Death
 While the wider culture may have been unschooled in the theological concepts of the self-
estranged will, or of evil as privation, scattered and fragmentary accounts of the execution suggest
that medieval men and women interpreted the meaning and propriety of the condemned’s suffering
by recourse to the same structures of thought and mode of feelings that shaped the faith and
thought of such learned figures as Aquinas, Julian, and Dante.  What one encounters in
descriptions of the medieval execution are traces of what fifteenth-century theologian Nicholas de
Cusa, called docta ignorantia, or “learned ignorance,” that bespoke a piety as profound as its
learned counterpart.236   In religious iconography and executionary ritual (which in the period
frequently intersect and overlap), in liturgical practices (such as devotion to the Eucharist host),
and in extra-liturgical practices (such as veneration of the saints and flagellant processions), the
belief in the unity of soul and body existing as one substance is expressed not as a philosophical
axiom but as an acute and affective knowledge that the flesh is a locus of salvific promise which
both renders visible the secrets of the soul and aids it to access the divine.  Within the chronicles,
237 For a somewhat like view of the execution in a little later period see Michel Bee, “la
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songs of deeds, and iconography  one finds this knowledge brought to bear upon the execution.
In these sources we find traces of a widespread belief in the potentiality of the condemned
to harness the brutalization of their flesh to the pursuit of a mystical union with God in imitation of
Christ’s suffering.237  The chroniclers, for the most part, are clearly moved by  the executions of
penitent men and women that they commemorate.  Their tone is compassionate, their language
laudatory.  The accounts suggest, albeit tacitly, that in dying well the offender not only heals the
breach between himself and God, but is also reconciled with the community that participates in his
death.
A. Possible Refutations and Competing Meanings  
The medieval belief that deformation, and mutilation, of the body can make visible the
hidden inner corruption that is wrought by the presence of evil within a being is well known
among medievalists.  To take but one example, disfigurement by the cutting off of a malefactor’s
nose is an issue in several Fourteenth and Fifteenth-century cases from Nuremberg.  In each of
these cases a husband or wife committed adultery and the wronged spouse attacked either the
paramour or the offending spouse and thus was guilty of assault or mayhem.  Significantly the
attacking spouses received extremely light sanctions (fine or the stocks) for the assaults
notwithstanding that the law on the books stated that the attacker should suffer a like injury as that
which he inflicted on his victim.  Tracing this specific mutilation in both the classical literature
and bawdy humour of  the period, Valentin Groebner mounts a strong case for the way in which
the populace associated the nose with sexuality seeing it as a figurative representation of the male
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is assumed to be a manifestation of inner corruption. R.I. Moore, Formation of a Persecuting
Society, (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 45-65.
240 For examples of attaint see Cal. Patent Rolls, 1452, p. 514; Ibid., 1451, p. 508.  On the
law of treason in England see J.A. Bellamy, The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle
Ages (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 191-95; J. R. Lander, “Attainder and Forfeiture 1453-1509,”
Historical Journal IV (1961), pp. 120-151; Cuttler, The Law of Treason, pp. 120-133.
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member.238  The act of deforming the adulterer’s face by mutilating his nose embodied,  made
visible, the inward sexual corruption of his being.  It is in the context of this belief that outward
deformity mirrors inner corruption that a missing or disfigured nose was grounds for exclusion
from ordination to the priesthood.239  
Much more problematic is demonstrating that there existed a widespread belief in medieval
Europe that mutilations and torments, such as occur for traitors, or even simple death by sword or
rope, could purify the condemned.  For one, it must be granted that neither the Church nor the
crown obviously embraced this understanding of the execution.  For example, practices such as
forfeiture of a felon’s property (moveable and/or immoveable) which occur both in England and
France, as well as the English practice of attaint whereby a traitor lost all civil rights to pass title of
property or to inherit bespeak the permanent character of the stain that was believed to cover the
offender as a consequence of his deed.240  And the Church’s unwillingness to participate directly in
the shedding of blood on the ground that it was the cleric’s duty to pray for nefarious and the
secular realm’s duty to wield the sword of justice suggests that as an institution the Church did not
view the execution in terms of a quasi-liturgical drama.  Though the ritual of auto de fe (public
241 Because the auto de fe has its heyday a bit after our period, it has not been discussed. 
Discussion of heresy too has been avoided for the focus here has been primarily upon the secular
jurisdiction.  For a general history of the auto de fe see, Henry Charles Lea,. A History of the
Inquisition of Spain (New York, 4 vols 1906-1907).   
242 Merback, Thief, p. 137.
243 Beaumanoir, Coutumes, § 883, ch 1, 446;  Carlo Calisse, A History of Italian Law
(New York, 1969), pp. 175; Guido Ruggiero,Violence, p. 41.  
244 Westminster Chronicle, p. 517.
245W. Gregory, “Chronicle,” The Historical Collection of a Citizen of London in the
Fifteenth Century, ed. J Gairdner (London, 1876, reprt.1965), pp. 191-197.
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penance) during the Spanish Inquisition, first recorded in 1481, indicates the complexity of the
Church’s thought on the link between blood letting and salvation, its insistence that the religious
not directly shed blood would seem to undermine the argument that the execution represented a
salvific drama.241                    
Second, the rituals of the medieval execution cannot be neatly contained within a single
historical narrative of aspiration.  Rather, the body and soul of the condemned, his humanity,
“became a kind of projection screen, a locus of negotiation and even struggle” between rival
modes of thought about the normative and epistemological import of the execution.242  The sources
reveal a struggle between those, such as Beaumanoir, who insisted upon the utilitarian value of the
execution to inspire fear243 and those who, like Jean Gerson, insisted upon the execution’s salvific
meaning.  So too, retribution has its place.  Chroniclers, in recording acts of wrongful homicide, 
remind their readers that “blood cries out for vengeance.”244  And in 1450 one  chronicler observed
that one could keep a political score card by simply watching the heads upon London bridge being
put up or taken down according to what party happened to be in power.  In popular expression that
year became known as “the harvest of heads.”245  
246 Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys contenant le Regne de Charles VI de 1380 a
1422, ed. M.L. Bellaguet, (6 vols., Paris, 1839-52) vol. 2, pp. 662-669.
247 Il costituto del comune di Siena (2 vols, Siena, 1903), vol. 2, p. 402.
248 Spierenburg, Spectacle of Suffering, p. 58.
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At times, various meaning of the execution conflate.  As we saw, within canonical texts
salvific and utilitarian justifications for punishment vie for dominance.  In the realm of theology
recall that Aquinas justified punishment upon both utilitarian and penitential grounds.  Conversely,
within the temporal realm, notwithstanding those secular authorities who spoke of penal pain as a
way to instill terror, remember that the royal pardon found its justification within a vocabulary of
mercy and charity that was charged with religious association and which reflected a view of
suffering as both redemptive and purifying. 
Thus, not surprisingly, two or more justifications for the blood sanction and/or pre-
execution torment appear within a single source.  In the fourteenth-century, a chronicler of Saint
Denis records a particularly brutal execution of two Augustinian monks who had claimed
supernatural curative powers.  Defrocked, and beheaded, the headsman then placed their heads on
lances, their cut-off limbs in front of the gates of Paris, and their trunks on the gibbet.  The
chronicler observes, “these two miserable men atoned for their iniquities and served as an example
to traitors and criminals.”246  At other times, strict utilitarianism is the rule.  Around 1300, the
government of Siena  issued a law declaring that the purpose of punishment was to inspire fear in
others and thus a gallows was to be built where the hanged were to remain until they fell of their
own weight.247  In 1461 the authorities in Strasbourg prohibited the removal of corpses after
execution because this meant “the gallows stood entirely empty, as if no thief were punished
here.”248  
249 For specific cases see for example Die Chronik des Henrich Deichsler, in Chroniken
der deutschen Städte vom 14 bis ins 16 (Leipzig, 1872), vol. 11, pp. 687-688.
250 Merback, Thief, p. 147.
251 Landucci, Florentine, p. 176. 
252 Chronique parisienne anonyme, p. 50-53.
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Within popular culture, violence against the body of a malefactor, be it only an act of
mutilation such as the gouging out of his eyes or the ultimate act of taking his life by sword, rope,
or fire, holds varied, and at times, conflicting meaning.  For example and as mentioned above, in
fifteenth-century Nuremberg the municipality treats assaults upon adulterous spouses lightly
notwithstanding that the written law proscribes that a wrongdoer suffer a like injury as that he has
inflicted.  The assaults typically concern the angered spouse attempting to or succeeding in
defacing the offending spouse or paramour by cutting of the nose.  Punitive violence, in this
context, seems to signify an attempt to save face, by the defacing of the culprit.249  At times
spectators to a corporeal punishment expressed hatred or contempt toward the offender.  Those
sentenced to the pillory found themselves at the mercy of a public encouraged by authorities to
pelt them with rotten fruit, mud, and dung.250  In 1500 three Florentine murderers went on the
executioner’s cart being “tortured most cruelly with red hot pincers through the city” and it is
recorded “all the people were desirous that they should be tortured without pity.”251  The
Chronique parisienne anonyme records the crowds shouting at Henri de Taperel’s execution “Let
him be hanged, thus 252 he will pronounce no more false judgment!”  The most intense expressions
of collective hatred were directed at traitors and political tyrants.  Although occurring a little after
our period, the accounts of the crowd’s unsatiable rage at Ravaillac who had murdered Henry IV
of France and its treatment of the corpse of Concino Concini, who was accused in the great public
253 Ronald Mousnier, L’Assassiant d’Henry IV (Paris, 1964), p. 32; “L’eterrent, obseques
et funnerailles de Conchine, Mareschal d’ Ancre,” R.O. Lindsay and J. Neu, French Political
Pamphlets (Madison, 1964), No. 3860;
254 Orest Ranum, “The French Ritual of Tyrannicide in the Late Sixteenth Century,”
Sixteenth Century Journal XI (1980), p. 71.
255 Ibid., p. 72.
256 Mousnier, L’Assassinat d’Henri IV, p. 34.
257 Ranum, The French Ritual of Tyrannicide, p. 79.
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Declaration et Proestation of 1617 of “usurp[ing] in the name of the king . . . an absolute authority
in the realm” and whom  Louis XIII thus felt compelled to assassinate vividly illustrate the popular
view of such men as unredeemable demons whose bodies must be annihilated in order to free the
community from their pollution.253  
In the case of Ravaillac, his breasts were pulled with pincers, the offending arm that had
stabbed Henry was plunged into burning sulphur, and his body was tormented with molten lead,
boiling oil and resin with hot wax being applied to the wounds.254  The crowd eagerly took a role
so that when Ravaillac was drawn by four horses the people pulled on the ropes to help the
horses.255   Actively the crowd worked to ensure that his suffering was severed from any hope he
may have had for redemption.  Priests seeking to administer last rites were prevented from doing
so by the populace while at the same time the crowd fell upon Ravaillac with swords, knives and
sticks to dismember his body.256  In the case of Concini, the people of Paris, moved it seems by
loyalty to King Louis and thus by contempt for the corpse of the tyrannical Concini , removed him
from his grave and cut his body to bits: “Parts of the corpse then were fed to dogs, the heart was
cooked and eaten with vinegar, the limbs were burned . . .and the ashes cast to the wind.”257 
B. The Social Practice of the Blood Feud and the Theme of 
258 E.g., Matthew Paris, English History From the Year 1235-1273, trans. J.A. Giles (3
vols., London 1852-54), vol. 1, p. 176, 409.
259 Samuel Edgerton, Picture and Punishment: Art and Criminal Prosecution During the
Florentine Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985), p. 44; Merback, Thief, 153.
68
Salvation and Communal Reconciliation 
Yet, notwithstanding institutional ambivalence about, or rejection of, the redemptive
possibility of bodily torment, it must be remembered that the scaffold is the place where social and
popular culture and formal legal, political, and religious institutions intersect.  What one finds at
this intersection is a reinterpretation of legal and religious forms of thought by both the witnesses
to the execution and the condemned.  Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by the way the bits and
pieces of information left to us point to a pervasive cultural commitment to penal violence and
blood letting as an instrument that freed the wrongdoer’s soul from the torment of its alienation
from self, community, and God.   The tolling of the bell as a prisoner was led to the scaffold, his
kneeling and public confession or his telling a story that stressed the necessity of punishment for
sins,258 the priest’s carrying of votive images near to the condemned’s face, (which  represented the
culprit’s penitential worthiness)259 and the crowd’s compassionate and respectful response to the
man who contritely and bravely faced his death hint at a cultural understanding of penal suffering
as a carrier of redemptive promise. 
What is striking about the medieval execution is the way in which all its elements
coalesced to transfigure the ritual of death whereby an act calculated to instill terror upon would
be wrongdoers became an act of spiritual and communal reconciliation.  I say “transfigured”
because 
in spite of the authorities effort to construct the execution as an act of ultimate defeat for the
260 Translated portions of these quotes are in, Ziegler, Trial, pp. 70-71. 
261 The thinker who would clarify the way in which deterrence and redemptive
punishment depended upon a radically different understanding of the constitutive nature of man
is the early nineteenth-century thinker, Friedrich Hegel.  He writes that to base punishment upon
the idea of threat “presupposes that a man is not free, and its aim is to coerce him by the idea of
an evil.”  F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right trans. T.M Knox (Oxford, 1967),§ 99, ad. 62.  He
continues, “To base a justification of punishment on threat is to liken it to the act of a man who
lifts his stick to a dog.  It is to treat a man like a dog instead of with the freedom and respect due
to him as a man.”  Ibid.
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condemned, the spectators and offender frequently act in unison to elevate the death ritual from a 
blunt exercise of judicial power to a liturgical drama centred upon salvation and sacrifice.  This is
not to deny that for some the execution surely was no more than an act of exemplary terror. So too,
in literary texts such as the fourteenth-century Karlmeinet the traitor Waellis’ death is both “a
penance for [his] sin, so that it will go well with [his] soul” and a message and “example” to the
world.260  In all likelihood, many who came to witness an execution took a similar view.  To the
unreflective understanding, the suffering body of the condemned both signified both a warning and
a carrier of redemptive hope.  Nevertheless, albeit perhaps unconsciously, each participant to the
medieval execution -- judge, crowd, cleric, executioner, and condemned –  was left to make a
cosmic choice: man was, in his essence, a reactive creature who, as the thirteenth-century
decretalist Hostiensis held, could not help but respond to incentives based upon temptation and
terror, or he was a being capable of being tested by his suffering and of using it as a means to
respond to the angels of his better nature.261  In the former case, the meaning of the condemned’s
pain was primal and simple: it served to cower those who witnessed it providing them with an
incentive for conformity and brutalized the one who suffered it.  In the latter case, suffering was
transformative, upraising, and reintegrating.  
The bits of evidence available suggest that  irrespective of the message authorities or jurists
262 Catherine of Siena, Letters, vol. 2, p. 695.
263 Edgerton, Pictures, p. 139.
264 Ibid.,  p. 130.
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thought the execution should convey, and contrary to the particular ontology of man implicit
within a utilitarian jurisprudence, participants, witnesses, and the condemned repeatedly choose to
keep faith with the thought that man is born “to form the angelic butterfly” and thus could
encounter his bodily suffering and death as a means to thwart his own defective commitment to
lawlessness” (Purg. Canto X, ll. 127-130).  The sources suggest a cultural sensibility that saw in
man – even in his status as a wrongdoer – a capacity to transcend his nature as a creature and to
respond, not to temptation or threat, but to that part of his being which medieval theologians,
mystics, and poets avowed remained tied to his Creator in even the darkest hour.  The tearing and
torment of the condemned’s body allowed him to be “bathed and drowned in the blood of Christ
crucified” and to “become so drunk” as to completely lose himself in union with the Good.262 
C. The Ritual of Purgative Pain
When the execution became a public spectacle is unclear.  Typically the gallows were
outside the walls of a city though in the case of sensational trials an execution might be staged in
various parts of a city centre.263  In some instances, the execution could occur in relative isolation. 
Henry Summerson concludes from his research of English gaol delivery and eyre rolls from 1200-
1350 that executions for felony were “commonly hole-in-corner affairs, with few witnesses.”264  
Yet, though few detailed accounts of the European execution exist prior to the sixteenth-
century,  it is plausible they were well attended from early in our period.  In late twelfth and early
thirteenth-century England, for example, the counties were visited every four to seven years by the
265  Summerson, “Attitudes,” p.122.
266 Paris, English History, vol. 1, 176 (1239); vol. II, p. 296 (1249).
267 Chronique parisienne anonyme du XIV siècle, ed. A. Hellot, (Nogent-le-Rotrou,
1884), pp. 53, 127, 167;  Landucci, Florentine, p. 204.
268 Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, ed. and trans. Majorie Chibnall, (6 vols,
Oxford, 1969) vol. 2, p. 321.  The execution is also mentioned in The Chronicle of Florence of
Worcester With the Two Continuations, ed. & trans. Thomas Forester (1968).  However, no
mention is made of Norman fear of the people.
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royal eyre which would hear all pleas of the crown as well as taking care of administrative
concerns of the crown.  These were huge undertaking lasting many days and drawing together
suitors and presentment juries from all around with as many as two thousand people in attendance. 
Those who were sentenced to death were usually dealt with quickly.  As Summerson observes, it
was common for four vills to participate in a felon’s execution.265  In Mathew Paris’ chronicle of
the early thirteenth-century, he mentions the “people” gathered to witness executions of rather
ordinary offenders as if such gatherings were common.266  On the continent, scattered references to
the executions of common malefactors who are without notoriety suggest that groups of some size
typically gathered to witness the deaths.  Remarks upon the “great multitude of people” recurs in
chronicle descriptions of early fourteenth-century executions in Paris and in fifteenth-century
Florence.267  And of course, when the condemned was politically or spiritually important, large
crowds gathered.  In the twelfth-century Orderic Vitalis relates the story of Earl Waltheof’s
execution in 1076 for conspiracy against his lord, William the Conqueror.  Orderic writes that the
Normans were cautious and took the Anglo-Saxon hero to be beheaded early in the morning
“whilst the people slept” out of fear that if awake the people would “prevent them carrying out the
royal will.”268  One chronicler estimates an audience of 200,000 people attended the 1475
269 Jean de Roye, Journal ou Chronique scandaleuse, 1460-1483, ed. B. de Mandrot,( 2
vols, Paris, 1894), vol. 1, 361.
270 Duby, Age of Cathedrals, p. 164.
271 Dean, Crime, p. 136.  On the Queen as intercessor see Paul Strohm, “Queens as
Intercessors,” Hochon’s Arrow (Princeton, 1992), p. 101.
272 P. Lemercier, “Une curiosite judiciaire au Moyen Age: la grace par marriage
subsequent,” Revue d’histoire du droit 33 (1955), pp. 464-474; Basin, Histoire, vol. 2, 376-77;
Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris, p. 250;  Esther Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice: Law and
Culture in Late Medieval France (Leiden, 1993), p. 193, n. 40.
273 Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice, p. 194.    
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execution of the count of Saint-Pol, constable of France, for treason.269 
The presence of witnesses and spectators is significant to the medieval execution.  Rather
than being passive observers, spectators acted as the vigorous guardians of the Deity’s justice and
His mercy.  Acts of intercession, with their obvious analogue in saintly intervention, could reduce
scaffold tortures planned for the condemned.  This was particularly true in the case of pleas by
women.  It is reasonable to speculate that such acts of female intercession found their justification
in the archetype of the Virgin Mary, the compassionate intercessor who cheated “Hell of its most
promising candidates.”270  Thus the body of Gilles de Rias, hanged for the rape and murder of
children in 1440 was saved from burning by the appeal of several noble women.271  In France and
Germany a man may be saved from his death if a woman interceded asking for the condemned’s
man hand in marriage.272  This custom is first recorded in 1274 in France and lasts into the
sixteenth century.273  Moreover, the crowd could stop an execution when there was error such as a
rope breaking or a beheading being botched.274  Lucas Landucci, a fifteenth-century Florentine
275  Landucci, Florentine, p. 204.
276 Gauvard, “De Grace Especial, p. 180
277 Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1381-1385, p. 373.
278  Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1354-1358, p. 529.  Andrea McKenzie, “‘This death some strong and
stout hearted man doth choose’: the Practice of Peine Forte et Dure in Seventeenth- and
Eighteenth-Century England,” Law and History Review 23 (2005), p. 300.
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diarist, notes an execution where the “compassion” of the crowd for a condemned man who
bravely faced his death became so overwhelming that the crowd attacked and killed the
executioner when he bungled the beheading.275  Similarly into the fifteenth-century when a
scaffold ladder was missing or found to be too short, jurists bowed to the popular belief that the
event was a sign of God’s judgment that the condemned was either innocent or a recipient of
divine mercy.  In these instances, the death sentence would be remitted.276  All of these customs
indicate a cultural readiness to accept a condemned man back into the communal fold.   
That judges and crown were responsive speaks to the way in which the juridical realm was
the custodian and interpreter of the storehouse of religious and ethical knowledge that comprised
the wider culture.  Although after the late sixteenth-century officials would curtly dismiss beliefs
in Divine signs as those of the rabble, in medieval Europe jurists did not shy away from
interpreting extraordinary events during the infliction of penal pain as a manifestation of Divine
will that constrained what mere human judges may do.  Thus in 1384 Richard II pardoned John
atte Puttes    after he endured peine forte et dure for so long that “it seem[ed] a miracle” he
remained alive.277  Similarly, in 1359, Cecilia Rygeway, accused of murder, received a full pardon
from Edward III after she “remained alive for forty days . . . without food or drink,  after the
manner of a miracle.”278  At times the king would grant a pardon at the last moment as in the case
279 Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1446-1452, p. 68. Ibid., 1441-1446, p. 278.
280 Merback, Thief, p. 149.
281 Fernand M Delorme and Anoysius L. Tautu eds., Acta Clementis PP.V (1303-1314)
(Rome, 1955), p. 95, no. 62 (1312).
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of the traitor Roger Chumberleyn who had been drawn, hanged, and then marked for
disembowelling with a knife when suddenly he received pardon from Henry VI out of reverence
and in imitation of “the Passion of Christ and the Virgin Mary.”279  
Conversely, when the populace or crown did not intercede, the salvific promise of Christ’s
passion “was nowhere more fully realized than in the redemption of the criminal who confessed,
atoned, and suffered his pain steadfastly.”280  Medieval representations of the Passion in painting,
woodcuts, and plays of the mid-fourteenth and fifteenth have long been studied for the manner in
which they reflected contemporary execution practices.  Much less studied is the way in which the
execution drew upon the Passion and contemporary beliefs about the significance of fleshy
violence and blood letting to man’s redemption and ultimate salvation.  Each step in the execution
ritual was directed toward elevating the execution into a ritual of religious sacrifice that tethered
together bodily violence to the soul’s purification.  
Across western Europe it was the custom to allow  the wrongdoer to perform some
penitential act prior to his death.  In thirteenth-century France, the condemned malefactor was
denied the right to penitence; yet, this was exceptional. It was in this context that Clement V, in
1312, forbade the practice of denying confession to prisoners.281  In Strasbourg the granting of
confession was a long standing custom.  In England, the thirteenth-century tracts Court Baron and
Placita Corone both represent a trial against thieves as concluding with a bailiff being told to take
282 Placita corone, ed. J.M. Kaye, Selden Society (London, 1966), 17; The Court Baron,
ed. F.W. Maitland, Selden Society (London, 1890), 64.
283 Summerson, Attitudes, p. 131.
284 Edgerton, Pictures, p. 160; Jean de Roye, Chronique scandaleuse, vol. 2, pp.349, 358-
61; Thomas Basin, Histoire des regnes de Charles VII et de Louis XI ed. Jules Quicherat (4 vols.,
Paris, 1855-59), vol. 2, p. 377.
285 Edgerton, Pictures, p. 141.
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the convicted man to see a priest.282  And Summerson records a case where “Cristina Cray, ineptly
hanged at Hereford in 1290, was said to have made confession to a Franciscan on her way to the
gallows.”283  
In the Italian city states, such as Florence, as well as in Rome, and France comforters from
organizations of lay brothers attended the condemned’s spiritual needs the night before his
execution.284  In Florence, the fact that the brothers counted Michelangelo and Lorenzo De Medici
among its members suggests the way in which succour of the condemned was intertwined with the
ideals of civic duty.  The cart which took the convicted man to the scaffold might stop before
designated shrines allowing the man a bit of respite to gather his fortitude.285  In fifteenth-century
Florence, the final stop before reaching the municipal gallows was the chapel of the Tempio
Brotherhood.  In c.1440 Fra Angelico painted a large tempera panel of a Lamentation for the altar. 
The facade of this little church, just a few feet from the gallows, was covered with a fresco
depicting the Passion of Christ.  Other paintings within the church were of a similar nature, with
one showing St. James the Lesser miraculously holding up two hanged victims to keep them from
strangling.  Fixed to the pavement, directly in front of the Lamentation was a stake to which the
condemned man would be chained thus allowing him to kneel and to receive the last rite before
286 Ibid., p. 194.
287 Cohen, The Crossroads of Justice, pp. 198-201.
288 Though the giving of the sacrament was never popular in France, quasi-sacramental
ceremonies occurred such as the constable of St. Pol being permitted to hear Mass and to
consume blessed water and bread before his death.  Jean de Roye, Chronique Scandaleuse, vol.
2, p. 358.
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being led to the gallows.286  
In some regions it was the practice not only to ensure that he be allowed to make
confession, but that he partook of the host. Though, in the central middle ages, the condemned
were frequently denied the Eucharist on the ground that it stayed in the body three days after
ingestion and “it would be a scandal if Christ, who is believed still to be in the gullet should be
delivered to the gallows,” by the end of the fourteenth-century, through the efforts of those such as
Jean Gerson (preacher and rector of the University of Paris) the condemned did receive the host.287
What is most striking is the way in which the witnessing community participated with the
condemned in the realization of his salvation.  So too, the flow of words, expressions of feelings,
and reciprocal gestures that occurred between the condemned and those who came to witness his
death carried a this-worldly significance.   Rather than an act of ultimate expulsion from the
community, there are traces of the idea in the sources that in offering up his body, the condemned
reconciles himself with the body of the community.  Indeed, once the Eucharist or ceremonies akin
to the sacrament of the Mass were allowed the condemned, he was emphatically included within
the corpus Christanorum.288   
Frequently the condemned confessed to the crowd or performed penitential acts in the
public space of the scaffold.  In Paris it was common for the condemned to be required to make
289 Pieter Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering (Cambridge, 1984), p. 53.
290 Bellamy, Crime and Public Order, p. 189. 
291 Paris, English History, vol. I, p. 409.
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amende honorable, a formal act of penitence usually performed in front of a church during a stop
in the procession to the scaffold.289  In a little later period in England, the offender was encouraged
by authorities to confess before the crowd and to evince his contrition.290  Typically these acts of 
confession were passionate and heartfelt.  In the mid-thirteenth-century, Matthew Paris speaks of
the execution of one William Marsh who had “lived as a pirate . . .indulging in plunder and
rapine.” At his execution he “poured out his soul in confession” to John of St. Giles persuading
Paris that the man had, as Giles said, gone to his death “by way of repentance.”291  
There are scattered references to similarly dramatic gallows confessions  in chronicles from
the fourteenth and fifteenth-century.292  In 1392, John Paule, a servant at the church of
Westminster, was sentenced to hang after being convicted of homicide.293  Though he had
attempted to clear himself of the homicide, in an effusion of self-condemnation on his way to the
gallows Paule declared himself deserving of death for “his treachery and ingratitude to God and
the church of Westminster in deceitfully luring out of sanctuary” persons who were later arrested
and hanged.294   In 1388 that on his way to the scaffold Sir Nicholas Brembre “devoutly recited the
Placebo and Dirige . . .and asked pardon of everyone . . .and thus with great contrition brought his
295 Westminster Chronicle, p. 315.  For another similar account of Brembre’s execution
see Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trails, ed. Th. B. Howell (London, 1809), vol.1, cols. 
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life to an end . . .his contrition and piety moved almost all the bystanders to tears.”295  In 1326
Hugh Despenser the Younger, reputed to be a monster and a favourite of Edward II was convicted
of treason in the aftermath of Queen Isabella’s and Roger Mortimer’s successful revolt against the
king.296  The Annales Paulini which gives a most full account of the events of 1326 records that
though he was “drawn through the whole city of Herford, then hanged, then beheaded,” he
“humbly and patiently suffered anything and professed publicly to all that he had merited worse,
and he often asked pardon of those who stood near and the passerbys.”297  Frequently, the dying
man promised to intercede on behalf of those who witnessed his death once he arrived in Heaven
purified of his sins.298  So too, he would beg the spectators to pray for him, in an act of
intercession, thereby diminishing his time in Purgatory.299  Perhaps one of the most well known
confessions is that of the rebel Jack Straw who detailed a plan by the rebels involved in the
Peasants’ Revolt to kidnap Richard II after being promised masses for his soul for three years.300 
The striking feature of these scaffold confessions is their vigour.  They do not ring with resigned
301 Die Chronik des Heinrich Deichsler, in Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom bis in 16.
Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1892), vol. 11, passim.
302Prosperi, “Il sangue e l’anima,” pp. 959-60
303 Domenico Caparozzi, “Compendio per conforto de’ rei condennati alla morte . . . ,” in
Viterbo, appresso Girolamo Discepolo (1613), pp. 56-57.
79
despair.  Rather, they evoke the image of men committed to their own death as a means of both
spiritual cleansing and of reconciling themselves to their community.
The witnessing spectators, in turn, respond to these shows of contrition with strong
emotions figuratively clasping the condemned to their heart.  Within the chronicles men and
women weep, cry out, offer prayers of intercession, and encourage the condemned moved by what
one late fifteenth-century chronicler of Nuremberg repeatedly calls the “beauty” of the repentant
malefactor’s death.301  Notwithstanding that the act of hanging or decapitation ended a
malefactor’s physical life, the sources leave the distinct impression that the witnessing community
bestowed forgiveness upon the penitent wrongdoer thereby reconciling him to itself though the
matter that comprised his body was crushed.  Indeed, in the Italian city-states it was important to
the legal authority that, even when there was the possibility of error and an innocent man faced the
scaffold, the condemned should die reconciled with those who killed him.302  In Italy the
comforters who attend the condemned to the scaffold in the late middle ages, urge him to not go to
his death with hatred, but to forgive judge, witnesses, and all others who have had a role in his
sentence.303  Upon reaching the scaffold it was not uncommon for the condemned to act with
graciousness toward the executioner.   Representative is the execution of Mansart du Bois in Paris
in 1411 who, in response to the headsman’s request for forgiveness for what he was about to do,
begged the executioner to embrace him.  The chronicler writes, “there was a great multitude of
304  Quoted in Johan Huizinga, The Autumn of the Middle Ages, trans. R. Payton & U.
Mammitzsch (Chicago, 1996),  p. 4.
305 Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris (140-1449),  ed. Jacques Megret (Paris, 1881 repr.
Paris, 1944), p.22. 
306 An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI
Written Before 1471, ed. J.S. Davies (London, 1856).
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people, who nearly all wept hot tears.”304  In 1413,  the provost Pierre des Essarts, who was
convicted of unjustly imposing the death sentence upon his political adversaries in the aftermath of
the unsuccessful Cabochien revolt, is quick to forgive his executioner.  “When he realized that he
must die he kneeled before the executioner, kissed a small silver pendant that the executioner
wore, and softly forgave him for his death.”305  In 1405, when the archbishop of York, Richard le
Scrope faced his executioner it is recorded that he “saide. . .to him that sholde smyte of his hed,
‘for His loue that suffrid v woundes for alle mankynde, yeue me v strokis, and I foryeue the me
dethe.’  And so he dede.”306  
The method of  execution contained a symbology that emphasized the kinship between
penal pain and spiritual purgation.  With the exception of Germany where death by the wheel and
by live burial remains frequent, the three most common blood sanctions in this period are hanging,
beheading, and being burnt at the stake.  Beheading, was said to be reserved for the upper nobility,
hanging for the masses, and burning at the stake for heretics or for those who had committed
particularly heinous crimes.  Beheading, Edgerton tells us, represented the removal of the
figurative crown from the head of the noble wrongdoer.  Thus, for example, in Giotto’s painting
Justice a woman is enthroned with a crown upon her head.  In her hands she holds the  scales of
justice.  In one pan, an angel brandishes a sword upon the head of a seated figure who wears a
307 Edgerton, Pictures, p. 126.
308 ST, 1a, q. 21, Reply
309 Myron Gilmore, ed. Vespasiano: Renaissances, Princes, Popes, and Prelates (New
York, 1963), pp. 337-338.
310 Ibid.
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crown.  In the other pan, an angel reaches to place a crown upon another seated figure.307  What is
personified is Distributive Justice who, according to Aquinas, “gives to each what his rank
deserves . . . good and bad, honour and shame.”308  It is against this symbolic backdrop that  the act
of beheading took on special meaning.  To decapitate a man was to remove the figurative crown
from his head.  The crown symbolized his nobility which was conceived of as a matter of his
virtue as well as of  his blood.   It was the way that many condemned wished to die. The sources
suggest that more was at stake than wanting to avoid death by strangulation at the gallows.  King
Edward IV's Constable John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester, was executed for treason in 1470.  His
friend, Vespasiano da Bisticci, wrote that “the people wished that he should die as the kings had
died” and thus the scaffold was covered with tapestries and carpets.309  Tiptoft then bade the
headsman to take off his head with three strokes “in honour of the holy Trinity.”310  Known as a
merciless constable who engaged in cruelty, one may doubt this show of respect from the people. 
Yet, what is striking about Vespasiano’s narrative is the way in which he portrayed the beheading
as a devotional sacrifice.  
Indeed, the visual aspect of beheading overflowed with soteriological imagery.  With the
exception of England, the usual procedure in beheading was for the condemned to kneel in prayer. 
The executioner would then strike his neck upright and from behind with a swing of a long heavy
311 Anonymous, Beheading With A Sword and a Body Broken on the Wheel 1417, plate 6,
in Lionello Puppi, Torment in Art: Paint, Violence and Martyrdom (New York, 1991), p. 17.
312 Ibid., passim.
313 Gerald D. Robbins, “The Executioner: His Place in English Society,” British Journal
of Sociology 15 (1964), pp. 234-253
314 Edgerton, Pictures, p. 134.
315 Ibid., p. 135.
316 Landucci, Florentine, p.4, 11, 213.
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sword.311  The image of the condemned appearing to be imploring for divine mercy at the moment
he suffers the blow was exceptionally poignant.  The many pictures painted in late medieval
Europe of Christian saints being martyred in this way attest to the image’s cultural resonance.312 
So too, the prevalence of the image suggests the way in which a penitential motif could blur the
lines between punishment and martyrdom.  Often in such paintings the headsman appears nearly
diabolic embodying in artistic form the disdain with which medieval culture held executioners.
Though he held the status as an officer of the law, he often lived the life of an outcast and was
treated as automatically notorious and thus deprived of certain legal rights.313  There is a sense,
says Edgerton, in which the medieval executioner stood in for Lucifer whom the Divine used to
keep man tested.314  His dress served to reinforce his iconic role.  On the continent he often wore
gaudy feathered hats and tight britches, and he performed his function stripped bare to the waist.
The gestures and equipment of the beheading served to transfigure an act of temporal justice into a
redemptive drama whereby the kneeling man, while not often a martyr, was posed as a soul
struggling for salvation in the presence of a demonic force in the shape of the executioner.315 
Strikingly, in fifteenth-century Florence the most common blood sanction was beheading
suggesting that in this formerly republican city-state even the lowly was allowed a noble death.316 
317 Bonaventura, The Mind’s Road to God, trans. G Boas (New York, 1953), p. 10.
318 Craig Harbison, “Visions and Meditation in Early Flemish Painting,” Simiolus XV
(1985), p. 90; Gertrud Schiller, Iconography of Christian Art, tr. Janet Seligman (Greenwich,
Conn., 1972), vol. 2, pp. 184–98; Flora Lewis, “The Wound in Christ’s Side and the Instruments
of the Passion: Gendered Experience and Response,” Women and the Book: Assessing the Visual
Experience, ed. Lesley Smith and Jane H.M. Taylor (London, 1996), pp. 204–229.
319 Paul Binski, Medieval Death: Rituals and Representation (Ithaca, 1996) pp.41-46.
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Hanging too had its symbolic imagery.  Rather than the hangman’s noose, it was the ubiquitous
hangman’s ladder that held special iconographic significance in late medieval Europe.  As an
instrument of the Arma Christi, the execution ladder invited its association with one of the most
sacred symbols of Jesus’ Passion.  Devotional writers such as St. Bonaventura speak of the world
as a ladder and which in contemplating we will “mount up to God.”317  Painters too employed the
ladder as metaphor for spiritual ascent.318  Ostensibly a punishment that signified degradation, the
gallows also served as an analogue for man’s capacity to share in Christ’s humanity through
suffering.    The ladder invited the penitent wrongdoer to figuratively ascend the Cross embracing
his suffering and ultimate death as the means by which his renewed devotion to God and thus the
Christian community became manifest.
Once the torments and/or death occurred, contemporaries took much time to record the
emotional posture of the wrongdoer as he died.  The making of a good death, shriven and in
preparedness with a contrite heart to deliver one’s soul to God, dominated lay religious life in the
fourteenth and fifteenth-century.  To this end, practical instruction booklets known as the Ars
moriendi were a common form of literature for the laity including the illiterate who relied upon
block-book woodcuts that illustrated the penitential steps a dying man must take, and the frame of
mind he must nurture, in order to achieve salvation.319  The discourse of the ars moriendi provided
320 Quoted in Theodor Hampe, Crime and Punishment in Germany: As Illustrated by the
Nuremberg Malefactors’ Books, trans. M Letts (New York, 1929), p. 78.
321 “Annales Ricardi Secundi,” Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland
During the Middle Ages, (Nendeln, reprint, 1964), p. 328.
322 The Brut of England, ed. F Brie (London, 1906-1908), vol. 2, p.476, Appendix F.
323 Diario ferrarese dall’anno 1409 sino al 1502 di autori incerti, ed. G Pardi, Rerum
italicarum scrptores, (Bologna 1928-38), vol. 24, pt. 7, pp. 162, 175.
324 Holinshed’s Chrconciles of England, Scotland and Ireland, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 6
vols. 1807-08), vol. 1, p. 310.  Sir Thomas Smith said much the same.  “In no place shall you see
malefactors goe more constantly, more assuredly, and with less lamentation to death than in
England.”  Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum, ed. L Alston (Cambridge, 1906), p. 105.
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popular culture with a way to interpret the bodily signs that accompanied death both at the
deathbed and at the scaffold.  Wrote one chronicler in admiration for  the resoluteness of an
offender in face of his pain, “he died like a Christ merrily and willingly.”320  In 1400 a witness to
the execution of John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, was similarly moved to record how the earl
faced his “fate” with patientia and humiliter.321  When in 1440 Sir Richard Wyche and Roger
Norman were condemned to be burnt for hearsay, the author of the Brut writes:
. . . and thus they ended their lives in this world.  And the peple that sawe theym dye, had
gret compassion on theym, for the confession and ende that they made in their good byleve,
and thanked God for his sonde.322
  And again in Ferrara in 1496 was recorded the death of forger who facing his death “staunch and
steadfast” and verbally reinforcing himself with the hope of salvation “made everyone cry who
saw him die so well.”323  In the sixteenth-century, Holinshed held that “our condemned persons
doo go so cheerefullie to their deths for our nation is free, stout, hautie, prodigall of life and
bloud.”324  
As we saw with the saints who engaged in imitatio Christi, the condemned’s willingness to
undergo his pain not only allowed him to assimilate Christ’s suffering, but to purify himself of the
325 “Annales Ricardi Secundi,” p. 328.
326 Merback, Thief, p. 153.
327 C. Gauvard, “Pendre et dependre a la fin du Moyen Age: les exigences d’un rituel
judiciaire,” Riti e rituali nelle società medievali, ed. J. Chiffoleau (Spoleto, 1994), pp. 204-205.
328 Dean, Crime, p. 137.
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sin of his wrong.  Through the suffering of his death, the traitor John Holland, sought to expunge
his “filth.”325  We find a like idea  in a long tradition of votive imagery devoted to illustrating the
culprit’s worthiness of redemption such as the fifteenth-century woodcut on the title page of Jacob
Issickemer’s miracle book where a demolished victim of the wheel is propped up before an altar
offering his suffering as supplication to an apparition of the Virgin and Child who look lovingly
down upon him.  Indeed the title of the piece is “The Virgin Receiving Offerings From
Pilgrims.”326 
Not all legal historians agree that the torment suffered by the condemned and his ultimate
death carried an otherworldly meaning that was understood by crowd, authorities, and the offender
alike.  Claude Gauvard vigorously argues against seeing the execution as a penitential ritual.  She
notes that the condemned did not dress in penitential garments and that they usually went to the
scaffold on a dung cart, “a mode of transport not associated with repentance.”327  Others note that
Florentine children played with the corpses of the condemned dragging them about or cutting off
the hands.  Dice might be made from their bones and occasionally the disembowelled innards were
thrown to the dogs.328  Still, only traitors were treated so roughly.  So too, though the convicted
customarily wore secular attire, the colours they choose to wear carried symbolic meaning.  This is
particularly true in the case of nobility where the colours chosen for their attire functioned as
statements, whose interpretation depended upon a chivalric-religious tradition, about hopes for
329 Cohen, Crossroads, p. 187; Michel Pastoureau, “Les couleurs medievales: Systemes
de valeurs et modes de sensibilite,” Figures et couleurs (Paris, 1986), pp. 35-49.
330 Letters of Catherine of Siena, T273, pp. 86-87.
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their soul in the aftermath of their death.329 
However nebulously, there drifted in the air the thought that by embracing his death, the
condemned acted to confirm his love of the Good and in so doing moved – like Dante’s penitents –
closer to bliss.  A dramatic, but not thematically unique, story was recorded by Catherine of Siena. 
In 1375 Nicolas Tuldo was sentenced to death in Siena for speaking against the city’s magistrates. 
Catherine wished to aid the young man in preparing for a good death and to offer him comfort. 
She visited him and later writes that “he was comforted and consoled so that he confessed his sins
and prepared himself very well” hearing Mass and taking communion.330  He beseeched Catherine
to accompany him to his death and she agreed.  Sometime after she writes that before being
beheaded “his will was united and submissive to the will of God” making an end as a “peaceable
lamb” who “called holy the place of justice [i.e. the gallows]!”331  In recording the event, Catherine
emphasized the joy with which Nicolas approached his death.  He laughed in delight in seeing her
at the chopping block.  He was meek in allowing her to place his neck on the block.  She writes
that when the blade struck his neck, “his mouth said nothing but ‘Gesu!’ and ‘Caterina!’ and as he
said this I received his head into my hands . . .my eyes fixed on divine Goodness.”332  Catherine’s
account of Nicolas’ death erases the line between sinner and beloved explicitly: God received this
soul “only through grace and mercy and not for anything he had done.”333  The blood Nicolas
334 Ibid.
335 Letters of Catherine of Siena, p.88 n.31.
336 Vincenzo Paglia, La morte comfortata; riti della paura e mentalita religiosa a Roma
nell’eta moderna (Rome, 1982), p. 84.
337 Henry C. Lea, Superstition and Force (1866), p. 285.
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sheds, and the ultimate suffering it brings, was – paradoxically – life bearing.  His blood was
“received into [Christ’s] own blood” and mingled with it as a “flame of holy desire” that lifted
Nicolas up into a “sharing” of that “tormented love” that had died for humankind.334
Catherine’s view of Nicolas’ death was not idiosyncratic.  The audience to the medieval
execution was evoked to the strongest feelings of compassion by the wrongdoer who endured his
agony in a way that signaled to the crowd his desire to please God through his suffering.  In the
case of Nicolas’ death, Catherine’s associate Fra Tomaso Caffarini who was present at the
execution writes that the crowd “marveled” at what transpired.335  So too the fluidity and
permeability of the line between sinner and saint stressed in Catherine of Siena’s account of
Nicolas’ death also appears in the practices of the confraternities who in comforting the
condemned at the execution regaled them with stories of those martyrs whose manner of death
most echoed their own.336  Indeed, the inversion that sees rebirth in death, and bliss in pain, was
not uncommon to the period.  A frequent motif in the late twelfth-century  miracle tales is of the
wrongdoer who is punished by the fastening bans of iron around his neck or arm who then is
banished “until by pilgrimage and prayer his reconciliation and pardon should be manifested by
the miraculous loosening of the fetter, showing that the soul [through the trials of the body] was . .
.released from [its] bond.”337   The kinship that existed between the condemned and the saint in
search of God insofar as each sought to transcend sin through the mortification of their flesh also
338 For late medieval literature see Jerome Baschet, “Les conceptions de l’enfer au XIV e
siècle: Imaginaire et purvoir,” Annales E.S.C. 40 (1985), pp. 183-205; for artistic expression of
the same idea in the fifteenth century see Alberto Tenenti, La vie et la mort  à travers l’art du XV
siècle (Paris, 1952), pp. 30-48;  Jean Gerson, Six sermons francais inedits, ed. Louis Mourin
(Pari, 1946), p. 81, 446, 462 (imagery of sinners as false traitors, cut throats; hell is a gibbet and
the devil its hangman); pp. 219-44 (sermon equating purgatory as prison and hell as death
sentence). 
339 Rubin, Corpus Cristi, p. 348.
340 Ranum, “The French Ritual of Tyrannicide,” p. 72.
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finds frequent expression in late medieval literature, art, and sermons.338  
The redemptive potential of the wrongdoer’s pain rested not so much in the fact that he
paid the penal debt as it did in the idea that his suffering was itself a revelatory sign of his  love of
the Good (qua God).  But, such bodily suffering was also efficacious.  Notwithstanding the
theologian’s and mystic’s call of contemptus mundi that sounds at various intervals throughout the
period, medieval culture was wedded to the belief that its world carried sacramental meaning.  In
stark contrast to the ancient and  early modern world, in the high and late middle ages the flesh did
not hamper man.  Rather, it aided him in encountering bliss.  In the context of veneration of the
Corpus Christi, Miri Rubin writes “it was this-worldly in emphasizing that channels of
regeneration and salvation were available and attainable, renewable and never exhaustible.”339  In
the context of the execution, folkloric tradition commingled with orthodox Christianity fostering
what the modern may consider to be gruesome practices.  The condemned’s suffering body not
only mapped the movements the soul’s striving for the Good.  Its physicality contained in itself
demonic and/or godly forces.  Demons were thought to reside in the unrepentant or traitorous
wrongdoer and thus one finds instances where witnesses to the execution ate of the dead man’s
flesh to ensure his obliteration.340  Conversely, the spilt blood of the wrongdoer who died a sacral
death was believed to contain curative properties and thus the sick and afflicted would attend the
341 Prosperi, “Il sangue e l’anima,” p. 965.  For the persistence of this practice in the
seventeenth-century see Evans, Rituals of Retribution,, p. 95.  On the belief in the healing
properties contained in the redeemed offender’s body parts and fluids see Piero Camporesi, The
Incorruptible Flesh: Bodily Mutation and Mortification in Religion and Folklore (Cambridge,
1988), p. 19; William S, Heckscher, Rembrandt’s Anatomy of Dr. Nicolaas Tulp (New York,
1958), pp. 164-166 n. 180. 
342  J Jusserand, English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages, p. 33; 
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344 On the belief that the penitent wrongdoer could attain heaven, rather than purgatory,
as a result of his suffering a representative example comes from a 1504 pamphlet by the
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execution to drink the dying man’s blood.341  In other cases, the bones of those who most bravely
met their death were kept as relics.342  More than an exotic practice of a few on the fringe of the
community, the confraternities for the comfort of the condemned at times gathered up their
dismembered body parts and the instruments of execution, in the manner of relics.343   
What these practices attest to is the strength of the belief in the spiritual efficacy of the
bleeding and tormented body.  The sublimity and profundity of medieval thought concerning the
transformation of suffering into salvation, of the essential unity of body and soul, and of the power
of physicality, aided by grace, to actualize the divine depended for its detailing upon a few
exceptional personages.  Nevertheless, the popular imagination intuited, albeit in an unreflective
and simplified manner, those movements of thought that allowed a belief in the power of the
suffering flesh to simultaneously release the wrongdoer’s soul from sin’s captivity, and to be at the
same time no more than a signifier of the soul’s striving toward the Good.  Notwithstanding the
growing number of jurists that justified the blood sanction by reference to its force as an
instrument of terror, the rituals that attended the execution suggest that its primary power lay
elsewhere: the thief, heretic, or murderer who died well achieved salvation and in some instances
glorification.344  At the moment the soul left Nicolas’ body, writes Catherina of Siena, she saw “
Nuremberg poet Kunz Has.  He writes of the execution of a baker’s assistant who has brutally
killed five people.  “After having all ten fingers chopped off, the murderer, who had confessed to
his crimes, was tortured with red hot pincers . . .before finally being impaled.  He had given the
executioner precise instructions on how to treat him so that his torment might last as long as
possible . . .Thus the murderer died among the crowd’s tears and prayers of intercession.  His
head had inclined to the right side, a sign, the poet explained that he had been forgiven and
accepted into Heaven.”  Groebner, Defaced, pp. 103-104. See also Monika Hellwig, “The Life of
the World to Come,” The Human Condition in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, ed. F.E.
Greenspahn (Hoboken, 1986), p. 215 on the doctrine of the immediate beatitude. 
345 Letters of Catherine of Siena, p. 88.  On reported miracles occurring at executions see
The Walsingham, Historia Anglicana, ed. H. Th. Riley (London, 2 vols. 1863-1864), vol. 2, pp.
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the God-Man as one sees the brilliance of the sun.”345  In devotional art such as the 1360 Bohemian
panel painting Calvary Christ languishes as the two thieves twist violently upon their crosses.346
The work in agonizing detail demands the viewer to witness the bloodbath of the triple execution. 
Yet, in the horror of Calvary, the artist locates its paradox:  The profusely bleeding wounds of
Christ’s hands drip upon the heads of the two thieves.  The Good Thief, his head contorted and
bent back upon his neck catches in his mouth the blood pouring from Christ’s wounds.  The image,
as did all medieval art of the Crucifixion, drew not only upon Scriptural symbology, but upon the
culture’s lived experience of the normative import of the penal execution.347  Catherine’s vision of
Christ at Nicolas’ execution and the customary practice of blood drinking at the execution by the
afflicted spoke to a cultural belief that in dying well the condemned was purified.  His purification,
in turn, contained a physical reality.  As in the miracle of the Eucharist, Christ mingled his blood
and flesh with matter thereby sanctifying it.  
C. The Unrepentant
348 M. Roberti, “Il libro dei giustiziati di Ferrara a 1441-1557,” Atti del R. Istituto Veneto
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In Ferrara in 1445, a certain Benà, a linen comber, and a murdering thief was hanged.  In
reading his sentence he said: “if he has ever seized a soul, let the Devil now take the soul from my
body.”348  The chronicler reports:
And when he had said the words it seemed as if all the carriages and carts . . .were flying
here and there, making a great noise: all the people ran away, some here some there, so that
Benato was almost the only one left. [And those who ran away] lost cloaks, berets and
shoes – and there was a great fright.349
The discussion thus far has focussed upon the condemned who repented of their wrong and, with
what must have entailed an unfathomable exertion of will, actively sought to locate in their
torment and death the presence of a loving God who had bestowed suffering upon their body and
soul as a mark of His devotion.  The question looms about the significance of the blood sanction in
medieval culture when the condemned refused to commit themselves to this sacrificial drama.  The
possible answers to this question brings the discussion to the point where learned religious,
philosophical, and literary thought divides, in some respect, from customary popular beliefs.
In the case of Benato, his tempting of Satan drives the crowd to a frenzy for just as the
medieval Deity could reveal His presence at the execution so too could demons.  The forces of
Good and Evil might well contend over the soul and body on the scaffold.350  The belief in evil as a
demonic force that infected the body and soul of the condemned was so culturally embedded that
across medieval Europe it was customary for an executioner to burn on the spot all the ropes that
he used in an hanging for fear that the instruments of the execution had become infected with the
351 L. Puppi, “Il mito e la trasgressione Liturgia urbana delle esecuzioni capitali a Venezia
tra XIV e XVIII secolo,” Studi Veneziani 15 (1989), pp. 107-30. 113, n.11; Prosperi, pp. 962-63.
352 Though this is not always the case.  For example, in 1584, the assassin of William of
Orange, Balthasar Gerard, suffered a most horrible death tortured for over eighteen days.  Finally
the prison Lieutenant was asked to finish him off by strangling him so that “his soul should not
despair and be damned.”  Brantôme, Mémoires. La Vie des hommes illustres, II, (1722), p. 191-
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same evil that pervaded the dying man and had led him to transgress the law.351  Often labelled by
historians as a “superstition” that shared little with orthodox medieval Catholicism, the belief in
the palpable reality of evil was a natural and intelligible implication of a religious culture whose
centerpiece was the image of the embodied God. 
What the torment of the condemned who stubbornly remained unrepentant signified to
those who witnessed the execution remains unclear for these are not matters the chroniclers
concentrated upon.  Rather their interest appears to have been  in the pains of the contrite
malefactor.  One can extrapolate from the sources that speak to the particularly rough treatment by
a crowd of traitors or tyrants that their torment was thought to mimic the pains that awaited their
souls in Hell.352  Gone from these fragmentary accounts of the recalcitrant offender is any
indication that the populace saw the dying man’s or woman’s anguish as a sign that their being
remained tied to God in the way, for example, spoken of by Dante in his poetic rendering of the
condition of the souls in Hell.
Nevertheless, insofar as “culture” refers not to what is popular and common but rather to
the highest forms of thought within a particular period that imperceptibly and incrementally shape
and carve a particular people’s distinctive character, something else can be said about punitive
pain in regard to the unrepentant offender.   We are brought full circle back to our discussion of
the scholastics, mystics, and poet.  Implicit in Aquinas’ account of evil as privation and of
353 Aquinas, On Evil, A.2, Response, p. 13; ST 1a2a, q., 35, art. 6, reply. 
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punishment as the countering of the will to evil (and thus as necessarily painful) is the thought that
the infliction of punitive pain is an act of honouring the very identity of the wrongdoer as a being. 
And since “being and good are convertible” what punishment honours by thwarting the will to evil
is the condemened’s goodness.353  Thus though the recalcitrant may view his ordeal on the scaffold
as no more than the brutal extinguishing of his life, understood from within the thought of 
scholastics and mystics such as Anselm and Aquinas, or Julian of Norwich and Catherine of Siena, 
the medieval blood sanction affirmed his essence as a law-worthy being.  
Returning to Dante for a moment, the condemned who suffered the sword, rope, or fire
without contrition cast himself to Hell.  Yet, as the Inferno illuminates, the condemned’s worldly
pains may be understood too as pointing to Divine love.  Recall that by committing themselves to
vice, the punished in Hell are divided within themselves for they thwart their soul’s natural desire
for the good.  They grieve the loss of “the good of the intellect” (Inf. Canto 3, ll. 17-18).  This
thwarting of their naturally “godly will,” as Julian calls it, is their soul’s primary anguish.  This
anguish of the soul, which is inextricable from the suffering experienced by the body on the
scaffold, is conceived by Dante as a sign of God’s ardour.  We return to Smith’s careful
explication of Dante’s text.  As Smith writes, it is by “preserving in [the sinner] the good desire
which is the source of their pain,” that God does not allow them to fall even further to evil thereby
extinguishing their being.354  Though Dante writes of the soul’s journey after death, his poem by
his own observation is also an allegory of the state of man insofar as he liable to the award of
punishment for wrongdoing.355  
356 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York, 1979), p. 46.
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Taken together, the thought of the learned, theologian, and mystic offer a way of
understanding punitive pain of the unrepentant offender that may or may not have been intuited by
the craftsman, burgher, spinner, noblewoman, or miserable poor who came to view the execution -
or by the condemned themselves.  But what the discourse of the poet, theologian and mystic does
tell us is that there existed in this period an intricate and multi-layered tradition of thought that
opened up the possibility of finding purpose and sacral meaning in the bodily pain and death of
even the most obdurate.
             Conclusion
This article has taken as its basic assumption that we cannot understand the meaning and
significance of, at times, horrific punitive attacks upon the body by the medieval legal order
without situating the blood sanction in a broad and deep cultural context whereby account is taken
of the way medieval western Europe thought about suffering not only in relation to punishment,
but in relation to evil, to the agony of the crucifixion, and to the union of the body and soul.  
 As Michel Foucault discerned in Discipline and Punish those who came to witness the
dying man’s death and, in some cases, torment questioned and took in “each word, each cry, the
duration of the agony, the resisting body, the life that clung desperately to it” for all this
constituted a sign of the soul’s progress to its salvation.356  The symbols of the medieval execution
suggest that more was at stake in the suffering and ultimate death of the wrongdoer than exemplary
punishment aimed to instill terror upon all would-be wrongdoers.  Considered collectively, these
rituals of pain and death indicate that the judicial authority was contingent upon a popular
commitment to, and preoccupation with, an idea of bodily suffering as both a conduit to the
357 Bernard of Clairvaux, “On Conversion,” Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works trans.
G. R. Evans (New York, 1987), pp. 69-70. 
358 Thomas of Cantimpré, The Life of Christina Mirabilis, trans. Margot H. King,
Matrologia latina 2 (Saskatoon, 1986), pp. 27-8; see also Caroline Walker Bynum, “The Power
in the Blood,” ed. Stephen Davis, The Redemption (Oxford, 2004), pp.177-207.
95
wrongdoer’s redemption and as a sign of his salvific status.  
This meaning, in turn, relied for its expression upon a rich traditional vocabulary of both
Christian and folkloric symbols.  Implicit in the rite of penal death in this period is a cultural
dedication to the idea that bodily pain was emblematic of the soul’s torment as it strived to realize
that part of itself that “never assented to sin nor ever will.”  Not only did the execution provide the
condemned with a way to harness his pain to his pursuit of his mystical union with God, the
sources suggest that in dying the good death the offender reconciled himself to his community.   In
this respect, and notwithstanding those discourses that envisioned the execution as an exemplary
act of condemnation, the narratives left to us suggest that in many respects the medieval execution
was praiseworthy and merciful, for it confirmed the condemned’s status as a law-worthy being. 
This understanding of painful execution depended upon, indeed was possible, because of
intense focus from 1200 to 1450 upon the nexus between soul and body.  Bernard of Clairvaux has
body speak to soul which is scolding it in his Conversion: “I am your body, your very self.”357  In
the thirteenth-century the hagiographer of Christina Mirabilis expresses the same:
Then, taking her feet with both hands, she would kiss the soles of her feet . . . and say “O
most beloved body!  Why have I beaten you?  Why have I reviled you?  Did you not obey
me in every good deed I undertook to do with God’s help?  You have endured torment . . .
.O best and sweetest body . . .is the end of your hardship, now you will rest in the dust . .
..and then, at last, when the trumpet blows, you will rise again purified of all corruptibility
and you will be joined in eternal happiness with the soul you have had as a companion in
the present sadness.358    
Rather than a prison which trapped the soul, body was both integral to human identity and a
359 Quoted in Bynum, The Power in the Blood, p.177.
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conduit of religious experience.  Thus in this period, the body in pain spoke to, reflected back, and
shaped, the experience of pain in the soul.  Behind this stress on the composite nature of human
identity was an intense and energetic emphasis in late medieval Christendom upon the embodied
and suffering Son.  His torn and bloodied all so human flesh was in the late medieval period the
paradigmatic image around which medieval culture revolved.  When turning their attention to
questions of soteriology and theodicy, scholastic theologians, mystics, the learned, and in some
fashion the culture at large, were forced to confront the relation between human redemption and
the brutalized flesh of a dying god.  Bernard would ponder “Why you ask me, by blood when he
could have done it by word . . . It is given to me only to know that it is so, not why it is so.”359 
Nonetheless, as we have seen in this discussion, men and women attempted to make sense.  It was
a short step from Calvary to the scaffold.  Representations in medieval art of the Crucifixion and
saintly martyrdom drew upon artists’ lived experienced of the rituals of the scaffold, wheel and
pyre. Conversely, however, a theology of blood, suffering, redemption, and sacrifice provided a
way for late medieval Europe to encounter the blood sanction and the condemned who endured it. 
The witnessing crowd, it may be speculated, knew not why the felon’s redemption must be by
blood; rather they only knew that it was so. 
